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ABSTRACT
This article evaluates an environmental protection instrument that the
literature has hitherto largely overlooked, Dirty Input Limits (DILs),
quantitative limits on the inputs that cause pollution. DILs provide an
alternative to cumbersome output-based emissions trading and
performance standards. DILs have played a role in some of the world’s
most prominent environmental success stories. They have also begun to
influence climate change policy, because of the impossibility of
imposing an output-based cap on transport emissions. We evaluate
DILs’ administrative advantages, efficiency, dynamic properties, and
capacity to better integrate environmental protection efforts. DILs, we
show, not only have significant advantages that make them a good policy
tool, they also help us to fruitfully reconceptualize environmental law
in more holistic fashion.
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THE MISSING INSTRUMENT: DIRTY INPUT LIMITS
David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden∗

In recent debates about how best to design regulatory
mechanisms to stem global warming, a new regulatory instrument has
begun to emerge. But we have yet to recognize it as such—to give it a
name or appreciate its implications for environmental law. Once we
name and define this new instrument, we’ll see that in a certain sense,
it’s not new at all. Although the academic literature has largely
overlooked it, it has for decades lain hidden in plain sight—playing a key
role in some of environmental law’s most significant success stories.
This article aims to shine a light on this previously unrecognized
instrument: to tell the story of its successes, evaluate its features, and
discuss its future prospects.
After decades of experience in designing regulatory instruments
to combat various forms of environmental degradation, the discussion
still largely revolves around a single dimension of the problem: the
choice between traditional regulation—often called “command-andcontrol”—and market-based mechanisms, like pollution taxes and
emissions trading.1 But designing regulatory instruments to address
environmental ills presents another important choice as well: the choice
∗

David M. Driesen is University Professor, Syracuse University
College of Law (effective July 1, 2008). Amy Sinden is Associate Professor, Temple
University Beasley School of Law. Thanks to Dean Hannah Arterian of the Syracuse
University College of Law and Dean Robert J. Reinstein of Temple Law School for
research support, the staff of the University of Michigan Law School Library, Myriah
Jaworski, Janet Moon, Shannon Markley, and Poliana Irrizary for research assistance,
and the participants in the University of Michigan Fawley Series, the Property
Citizenship and Social Entrepreneurism workshop at Durham University and Jonathan
Wiener for their comments.
1
See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive
Program: Beyond the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 290-91 (1998) (explaining that scholars employ a
“conventional dichotomy” contrasting “command and control regulation . . . with
economic incentives”). See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental
Policies: What Can We Learn from U.S. Experience (and Related Research), in
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY
YEARS EXPERIENCE 19 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad, eds. 2007) (distinguishing
market-based approaches from conventional approaches “frequently characterized as
command-and-control approaches”); Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, Comparative
Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND
ENERGY ECONOMICS, Vol. I, 395 (Alan V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney, eds., 1985);
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, & Robert Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313, 313-14 (1998);
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 Yale L. J. 677, 679 (1999); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Comment Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).
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between outputs and inputs. Virtually all of our existing environmental
regulation, whether traditional or market-based, focuses on polluting
processes’ outputs.
Traditional regulation requires each pollution
source to meet the output limit in its permit, while a trading regulation
allows polluters to trade permits so that a polluter facing high control
costs can pay a polluter with low control costs to make extra reductions
in her stead.2 But both limit outputs.
Governments, however, can also reduce pollution by reducing
inputs. To reduce automobile air pollution, for example, we can either
limit the output of exhaust coming out of the tailpipe or the input of gas
going into the engine. While we’ve traditionally focused vehicle
regulation primarily on the exhaust output, designing regulation to stem
global warming poses challenges for that model. Accordingly, some of
those designing climate change regulation have begun to shift away from
the usual focus on outputs. A number of proposals for climate change
regulation, including the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act
currently pending in Congress, address the transportation sector by
imposing a quantitative cap on the carbon content of fossil fuels
refineries and importers introduce into the economy.3 This represents a
fundamental shift in focus from outputs to inputs.
Although it has yet to be recognized as such, a quantitative cap
on the carbon content of fossil fuels is an example of a distinct and
underused type of regulatory instrument with far-reaching implications
both within the climate change context and beyond. We call this new
instrument “Dirty Input Limits” (DILs). DILs are regulatory limits on
the inputs that constitute the root causes of pollution. They can take the
form of traditional performance standards, requiring each producer or
importer of a dirty input to keep production levels within the limits in its
permit, or they can be made tradable, allowing a firm to produce more
than the limit allows if it pays another firm to produce less than the limit.
We argue below that DILs offer an important alternative to outputfocused regulation, and that policy makers should consider this
alternative in tackling serious environmental problems requiring
fundamental change. Because they have the capacity to simultaneously
reduce multiple sources of environmental degradation along a production
stream and to spur fundamental technological innovation, DILs offer
significant advantages over existing regulation in many contexts. They
also have the capacity to spark a reconceptualization of environmental
law, away from the fragmented, pollutant-by-pollutant approach that
now dominates the field.
2

See Driesen, supra note 1, at 290; J. H. DALES, POLLUTION PROPERTY

AND PRICES 92-100 (1968).
3

See infra, notes 65 to 74 and accompanying text (describing
Lieberman-Warner bill).
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Part one introduces DILs. Part two analyzes DILs’ advantages
and disadvantages. Part three articulates some conclusions about DILs’
potential role in improving environmental law, using the example of a
DIL limiting oil use. Used to limit fossil fuels, DILs offer a streamlined
and effective regulatory tool for addressing global climate change, while
simultaneously achieving a host of other important policy goals as well.
I. DILs: An Introduction
This part begins by distinguishing between two fundamentally
different means that polluters can employ to reduce pollution outputs:
“End-of-the-pipe controls” reduce pollution at the end of the production
process while “pollution prevention” reduces pollution by reducing or
eliminating inputs. We then go on to show that even though policymakers and scholars have consistently stated a preference for pollution
prevention, environmental law generally regulates pollution outputs,
rather than the inputs that create pollution. We then describe how Dirty
Input Limits offer an alternative regulatory instrument that limits inputs.
Finally, we tell the story of how DILs, while not recognized as a distinct
regulatory instrument, have already produced some of our most
conspicuous environmental success stories.
A. Inputs, Outputs, and Production Streams
Production usually creates two outputs, a desired product or
service and an unsought byproduct, pollution. Driving a car, for
example, produces a desirable output, mobility, but also creates air
pollution outputs as byproducts. And a coal-fired power plant releases
air pollution as an output through its smokestack as a byproduct of the
production of a desirable output, electricity.
A production process creates these outputs by using and often
transforming inputs—the gasoline that makes a car’s engine run or the
coal a power plant burns, for example. The character and quantity of
pollution outputs depends heavily upon the nature and quantity of these
inputs. The use of unleaded gasoline eliminates lead pollution from a
car’s exhaust, and the use of low-sulfur coal reduces sulfur dioxide from
a power plant’s emissions. Moreover, a single input usually produces
several different pollution outputs, often in several media. For example,
a pulp and paper plant using chlorine as an input produces a variety of
water and air pollution outputs.4
4

See Environmental Protection Agency, Effluent Limitations
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp,
Paper, and Paperboard Category; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
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Polluters can reduce or eliminate pollution outputs in two
fundamentally different ways:
1) End-of-the-pipe controls: Under this method the
polluter does not change its inputs or production
processes. Thus, it does not reduce the amount of
pollution initially created. Instead, the polluter adds
on some device—like a catalytic converter, a
smokestack scrubber, or a carbon sequestration
process—at the end of the production process to
reduce the amount of pollution actually released into
the environment.
2) Pollution Prevention: Alternatively, polluters can
reduce or change inputs in order to reduce or
eliminate the initial creation of pollution. Changing
or reducing inputs may require moderate or radical
changes to the production process itself. An electric
utility, for example, might reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions from its coal plant by substituting low
sulfur coal inputs for high sulfur coal. Alternatively,
it might eliminate pollution outputs altogether through
a radical alteration of the electricity production
process—replacing the coal-fired power plant with a
field of wind turbines.
Both academics and policymakers have long favored pollution
prevention over end-of-the-pipe controls.5 For one thing, the literature
recognizes that end-of-the-pipe controls sometimes achieve pollution
reductions in one medium, in part, by transferring the pollution problem
to another medium. Pollution controls that municipal waste combustors
use to limit air pollution, for example, often produce a toxic fly ash that
can present solid waste disposal problems.6

Pollutants for Source Category; Pulp and Paper Production, 58 Fed. Reg. 66078,
66,092, 66,101-02 (Dec. 17, 1993) (describing toxic pollutants discharged into air and
water from pulp and paper mills resulting from chlorine use).
5
See, e.g., Kurt Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention,
and Environmental Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 1 (1997) (cataloging pollution
prevention’s advantages); NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, BRIDGE TO
A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 4, 8
(1995) (praising shift in environmental policy from end-of-the-pipe technology to
pollution “avoidance”).
6
See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328,
330 (1994).
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Additionally, end-of-the-pipe controls focus on one type of
output into a single medium at a time. Hence, effectively controlling all
relevant pollution outputs using end-of-the-pipe controls often requires
the installation of multiple end-of-the-pipe controls for different types of
pollution. This can involve a lot of expense and spawn fragmented
decision-making.
By contrast, pollution prevention can eliminate many different
types of pollution in several different media simultaneously.7 For
example, diminishing the amount of gasoline input a vehicle uses
reduces hazardous air pollutants associated with cancer,8 pollutants
associated with smog,9 carbon dioxide causing global warming,10 and oil
runoff causing water pollution.11 Furthermore, pollution prevention
often saves operators money either in absolute terms or relative to the
costs of end-of-the-pipe controls.12 Thus, the conventional account
favors pollution prevention—the reduction or elimination of dirty inputs.
Indeed, Congress implicitly endorsed this account in 1990 when it
passed the Pollution Prevention Act,13 which declared a national policy
favoring pollution prevention.14
7

See Strasser, supra note 5, at 7, 45-46.
See Joan Leary Matthews and Louise G. Roback, California CruisinNew York's Adoption of California's Vehicle Emissions Program, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK 36, 36(1998) (pointing out that vehicle emissions account for over half the
cancer risk from toxic pollution in New York urban areas); John Hiski Ridge,Comment:
Deconstructing The Clean Air Act: Examining The Controversy Surrounding
Massachusetts's Adoption Of The California Low Emission Vehicle Program, 22 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 163, 167 (1994) (pointing out that mobile sources are the nation's
largest source of cancer causing toxic emissions).
9
See Matthews & Roback, supra note 9, at 36 (stating that automobiles
account for over half of New York volatile organic compound and nitrogen oxide
emissions).
10
See Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The
Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 515, 542 n. 94 (2004) (quantifying the average annual per vehicle emmissions of
carbon dioxide).
11
See EPA, Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68722, 68725
(December 8, 1999) (explaining that pollution runoff from vehicles is a significant
source of water pollution).
12
See, e.g. Fully Halogenated Chloroflurocarbons, 42 Fed. Reg. 24542,
24544 (1977) (predicting $58 to $240 million in consumer cost savings from switching
from fully halogenated chlorofluroalkanes as aerosol propellants to other products).
13
42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (2000).
14
In this statute, Congress found “significant opportunities” to “prevent
pollution at the source through cost-effective changes in production, operation, and raw
materials usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 13101(a)(2) (2000). Accordingly, Congress declared a
“national policy” that “pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source wherever
feasible. 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b) (2000). It declared pollution prevention preferable to
recycling, end-of-the-pipe “treatment” and release of pollutants into the environment.
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 13102(5) (2000) (defining “source reduction”).
8
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This conventional account may have exaggerated pollution
prevention’s benefits by suggesting that it always is cheap.15 As we
explore further in Part II, pollution prevention can sometimes prove
more expensive than end-of-the-pipe controls, at least vis-a-vis a single
polluting output.16 But the conventional account has also tended to
understate some of the most far reaching and important advantages of
pollution prevention. We highlight these under-appreciated advantages
here.
Pollution prevention produces significant advantages over endof-the-pipe controls because it reduces multiple polluting outputs
simultaneously. This occurs not only because a single production
process may produce more than one pollution output, but also because
reducing an input may reduce a whole series of pollution outputs from
multiple production processes all along a production stream.17 This
feature of pollution prevention arises from inputs’ place in a production
stream. Inputs consist of either raw materials, such as coal, or
manufactured products, such as gasoline. Hence, a given input in one
production process must either be the product of some previous
production process (e.g. gasoline) or the result of extraction of a natural
resource (e.g. coal). This relationship among processes implies that
reduction of dirty inputs also reduces the amount of a natural resource
being extracted or the amount of a product being manufactured to create
the input (or both). Since the processes creating dirty inputs usually also
generate pollution outputs, pollution prevention usually reduces
pollution outputs in two or more different production processes
simultaneously.
These relationships among processes imply that input reductions
have a multiplier effect. If, for example, we reduce the amount of
gasoline going into every car, we will do more than simply reduce the
amount of exhaust coming out of each tailpipe. We will also reduce the

15

See Michele Ochsner, Pollution Prevention: An Overview of
Regulatory Incentives and Barriers, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 586, 590-91 (1998).
16
See infra notes 134 to 145 and accompanying text.
17
A fairly extensive literature on Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) looks at
production streams in a similar way, attempting to describe (usually in quantitative
terms) all of the resources used and pollution emitted throughout the life cycle of some
product, from resource extraction, to manufacture, to product disposal. See Anthony D.
Owen, The Transition to Renewable Energy, in THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
259, 262-63 (Anthony D. Owen & Nick Hanley, eds. 2004); Margaret Walls & Karen
Palmer, Upstream Pollution, Downstream Waste Disposal and the Design of
Comprehensive Environmental Policies, RFF Discussion Paper 97-51-REV (Jan. 2000).
See also Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented, Federal Eco-Information
Policy, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1435 (1995) (arguing that cost and data limitations require LCA
analysts to rely on numerous simplifying assumptions which make LCA highly
manipulable in practice).
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pollution and ecological disturbance caused by oil drilling,18 transporting
oil (air pollution from loading oil tankers and potential for oil spills),19
oil refining,20 and leaking storage tanks in gas stations.21
We can visualize the production of automobile mobility, for
example, as a stream, beginning with the extraction of crude oil, ending
with the burning of gasoline in a car’s engine to produce mobility, and
producing a series of dirty outputs along the way:

Figure 1: The automobile mobility production stream
A drilling process produces oil, which the producer ships to a refiner.
Both the drilling process and the shipping process create pollution, but
they also deliver a useful product, oil, which becomes the input for
another process, oil refining. The oil refiner takes oil as an input and
creates more pollution, mostly hazardous organic compounds of various
18

See U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR
21 CENTURY: FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY 361
(2004) (describing the environmental harms associated with offshore oil drilling),
available
at:
http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/welcome.html#final

THE

ST

19

See Margriat F. Carswell, Balancing Energy and the Environment in
THE ENVIRONMENT OF OIL 179, 182-85 (Richard J. Gilbert, ed. 1993) (describing
impacts of oil transport on air, water and biological resources).
20
See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Compliance Sector
Notebook Project, Profile of the Petroleum Refining Industry, EPA/310-R-95-013, at
42-57 (1995) (summarizing TRI data on pollution releases from oil refineries),
available
at:
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/assistance/sectors/notebooks/pet
roleum.html
21
See Use of MTBE as a Fuel Additive to Gasoline, 65 Fed. Reg.
16094, 16100-02 (2000) [hereinafter MTBE Proposed Ban] (explaining that a ban of
MTBE might be necessary, because in spite of extensive regulation governments have
not been able to prevent oil spills and gasoline leaks).
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kinds, but also a product, gasoline.22 And then the gasoline becomes an
input into a car, which produces yet more pollution, and a really useful
output, mobility.
A production stream involves a flow from an upstream extraction
of a natural resource to a downstream end-use. We will refer to
processes closest to the natural resources extraction end of these
production streams as “upstream” and those processes closest to
consumption as “downstream.” (See Figures 1 and 2.)
Imposing end-of-the-pipe controls on the pollution produced by
automobiles addresses only one of the many sets of dirty outputs
associated with the oil/automobile mobility production stream.
Reducing inputs at any point along the stream, on the other hand,
constricts the flow through the entire stream and thereby reduces not
only the dirty output associated with the particular production process at
issue, but a whole series of dirty outputs all along the stream.23 Thus,
limiting the amount of gasoline cars can use, for example, would not
only limit car exhaust, but also reduce the dirty outputs from oil drilling,
transport, and refining as well.
Similarly, if we reduce (or eliminate) the coal going into each
power plant, we do more than simply reduce the amount of air pollution
coming out of power plant smoke stacks. We reduce the number of coal
miners killed or injured by mining, ecological devastation and water
pollution caused by coal mining, and the pollution from processing and
transporting coal.24
The production stream associated with the coal input to coalfired power plants can be visualized as follows:

22

See Andrew P. Moriss & Nathaniel Stewart, Market Fragmenting
Regulation: Why Gasoline Costs so Much (And Why It’s Going to Cost More), 72
BROOKLYN L. REV. 939, 957-62 (2007) (describing oil refining’s evolution).
23
See, e.g., Ozone-Depleting Chlorofluorocarbons:
Proposed
Production Restriction, 45 Fed. Reg. 66726, 66730-31 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 CFC
Proposal] (explaining that a production restriction would create price increases that
would induce users to switch to other substances).
24
See Fred Bosselman, The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power,
15 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. J. 1, 24-37 (2007) (discussing coal’s impacts on human health and
the environment); MICHAEL SHNAYERSON, COAL RIVER: HOW A FEW BRAVE
AMERICANS TOOK ON A POWERFUL COMPANY-AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT-TO
SAVE THE LAND THEY LOVE (2008) (discussing mountaintop removal mining’s
environmental impacts).
Limited DILs may have limited multiplier effects. A DIL limiting the use of
high sulfur coal would reduce the impacts that mining high sulfur coal has on health
and the environment. But it would increase impacts from mining low sulfur coal, just
as the acid rain program did. A DIL limiting coal use altogether would have broader
positive ripple effects on mining’s impact on health and the environment.

9

Dirty output: air pollution

Dirty output: fugitive PM
emissions, air pollution
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Figure 2: The coal-fired power plant production stream
Some of the assumptions used in economic modeling might
suggest that end-of-the-pipe controls can have some of the same ripple
effects that pollution prevention measures have up and down the
production stream. We might, for example, predict that requiring
installation of catalytic converters in automobiles would raise the price
of cars and therefore reduce the amount of driving. If this end-of-thepipe control reduced driving, it would ultimately reduce oil and gasoline
consumption just as a pollution prevention measure would. But the
mechanism by which pollution prevention creates ripple effects through
the production stream is fundamentally different from the mechanism by
which end-of-the-pipe controls might do so. Pollution prevention’s
ripple effects arise from physical flows, not unpredictable economic
incentives.25
Furthermore, for a number of reasons, end-of-the-pipe controls
rarely produce the consumption changes that economists sometimes
posit in modeling environmental policy instruments’ efficiency. First of
all, the increased cost of an end-of-the-pipe control may never reach the
consumer.26 While producers certainly will want to pass the increased
25
Cf. J. L. Lewin, Energy and Environmental Policy Options to
Promote Coalbed Methane Recovery, Atomic Energy Commission USA—Reports 497,
502-05 (Conference 950572) (1995) (doubting that coal mining firms will respond to
pollution taxes as vigorously as economic models would predict); Margrethe Aune,
Energy Comes Home, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 5457 (2007) (arguing that home energy
consumption does not conform to a rational economic actor model); Kevin Maréchal,
The Economics of Climate Change and the Change of Climate in Economics, 35
ENERGY POL’Y 5181, 5183 (2007) (overwhelming evidence shows that consumers
neglect cost saving energy efficiency measures).
26
Cf. Anna-Lise Linden, Annika Carlsson-Kanyama, Bjorn Eriksson,
Efficient and Inefficient Aspects of Residential Energy Behavior: What are the Policy
Instruments for Change, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1918, 1923 (2006) (noting that Swedish

March 4, 2008 Draft

THE MISSING INSTRUMENT

10

cost associated with pollution control on to consumers, in highly
competitive markets they may worry about lost sales and keep prices
constant.27 Second, even if the cost reaches the consumer, the consumer
may simply pay the cost rather than decrease consumption.28 For some
consumers, driving is a practical necessity and they will find other ways
of cutting costs if forced to absorb increased costs when buying a new
car. The large increase in vehicle miles traveled since the introduction
of catalytic converters suggests that one should not assume that an
absolute decrease in consumption will necessarily result from any given
cost increase.29 End-of-the-pipe controls will only rarely produce the
kinds of ripple effects that pollution prevention measures will reliably
produce.
B. The Anatomy of Pollution Control Mechanisms
The vast majority of our mandatory environmental regulations
focus on pollution outputs rather than production inputs.30 This is
apartment dwellers keep their dwellings hotter than homeowners, because the
homeowners bear the incremental cost of additional energy use, but the apartment
dwellers do not).
27
See, e.g., Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg.
11299, 11310 (1978) (predicting that cosmetic and chemical firms phasing out ozone
depleting substances will not be able to pass on cost increases to consumers, because
doing so will produce market share losses). Economists use a property known as price
elasticity to describe this possibility. If producers can raise prices without losing sales,
economists describe the price as elastic. When the prices are elastic, economic models
predict that producers will pass on cost increases to consumers. When raising prices
will reduce sales, economists describe the prices as inelastic. Inelastic prices may force
producers to refrain from passing cost increases on to consumers through raised prices.
See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS -- (17th ed. 2001).
28
See generally DAVID B. GOLDSTEIN, SAVING ENERGY: GROWING
JOBS 154-172 (2007) (discussing reasons that markets often do not produce
economically rational decisions).
29
See Implementation of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 104th Cong. 7 (1995) (testimony of Barry Felrice, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration) (vehicle miles traveled increased by over 60% between
1975 and 1993).
30
The Clean Air Act imposes limits on emissions from smokestacks, 42
U.S.C. §7411 (2000) (new source performance standards), and tailpipes, 42 U.S.C. §
7521(2000), and the Clean Water Act imposes limits on effluent from outfall pipes and
other water pollution outputs, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). Two exceptions to this
focus on outputs are the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§
2601-92 (2000), which authorizes EPA to ban or limit the production of toxic
substances, and The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Amendments
of 1972 (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000), which authorizes EPA to ban the sale
of or limit use of pesticides. Both of these statutes have produced remarkably little
regulation by EPA however. See Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy
Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2343 (2002); Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal
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perhaps understandable, since it is pollution outputs that proximately
cause harm. But to the extent the United States government has focused
on inputs, it has usually done so through voluntary programs.31 For
example, EPA has created a 33/50 program, where chemical companies
volunteer to reduce priority toxic pollutants through pollution
prevention, such as process changes that reduced the use of a priority
toxic pollutant as a feedstock.32
The mandatory output-based regulation that currently dominates
U.S. environmental law falls into four fundamental categories: (1) Work
practice standards dictate the use of specific technologies to control
pollution outputs.33 Such a regulation might, for example, require the
installation of catalytic converters in automobiles, or require the
installation of scrubbers in coal-fired power plants.34 (2) Performance
standards require a particular level of pollution reduction without
directly dictating technological choices.35 A performance standard
would require that emissions from a tail pipe or a smoke stack not
exceed a particular limit, but give the car manufacturer or the power
plant operator discretion as to how to meet that limit. (3) Pollution taxes
simply require the polluter to pay a set fee to the government for each
Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10
YALE J. L. REFORM 369 (1993).
31
See Ochsner, supra note 15, at 598-601; Robert F. Blomquist,
Government’s Role Regarding Industrial Pollution Prevention in the United States, 29
GA. L. REV. 349 (1995).
32
See Timothy T. Jones, Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Mary Ellen Ternes,
Environmental Compliance Audits: The Arkansas Experience, 21 U. Ark. Little Rock
L. Rev. 191, 236 (1999).
33
See Bohm & Russell, supra note 1, at 444; see, e.g., Adamo
Wrecking v. EPA, 434 U.S. 275, 287, 294-95 (1978) (discussing a work practice
standard requiring wetting down of buildings during demolition to avoid asbestos
emissions). Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(h)(3), 7412(h)(3) (2000) (authorizing EPA to
approve adequately demonstrated substitutes for the compliance technique required by
its regulations). The provisions in the environmental statutes authorizing work practice
standards allow for a wide variety of techniques, including pollution prevention. See,
e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(1), and § 7412(h)(1) (2000). But in practice, the agencies
usually focus on output controls.
34
Cf. Driesen, supra note 1, at 298 & n. 50 (showing that pollution
control law disfavors work practice standards). In fact, the EPA regulations that
encouraged installation of catalytic converters and scrubbers took the form of
performance standards. See id. at 300-301; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(g) (1994). These are
stylized examples to make the point clear.
35
See Driesen, supra note 1, at 297-98; Robert W. Hahn & Robert N.
Stavins, Incentive-Based Regulation: A New Era for an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1,
5-6 (1991) (describing performance standards as identifying a “specific goal” without
specifying the means the firm must use to meet the goal); Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 1259, 1268 (1981) (recognizing that performance standards allow firms to
choose the cheapest method of achieving compliance).
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unit of pollution she produces.36 (4) An emissions trading scheme
establishes performance standards, but allows each polluter to exceed
the limit set for its own facility if it pays somebody else to reduce in its
stead.37 Under such a scheme, polluters with low pollution control costs
have an incentive to reduce pollution levels and sell excess permits to
producers with high pollution control costs.38 In this way, polluters
deliver a given amount of aggregate pollution reduction at the lowest
cost.39
Scholars frequently frame debates about these regulatory
mechanisms in terms of a conventional dichotomy between “command
and control” regulation and “market-based mechanisms.”40 Writers
36

See Stavins, supra note 2, at 21 (describing a pollution tax as
assessing a charge on the amount of pollution that a firm or other source generates).
37
See Driesen, supra note 1, at 290 & n.2 (describing trading as
allowing “polluters to avoid reductions at a regulated pollution source”, if they pay for
or make “equivalent reductions elsewhere”); David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit
Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Techology, 16 J. ENVT’L
ECON. & MGMT. 52, 54 (1987).
38
See Stavins, supra note 1, at 22 (firms reducing their emission below
allotted levels can sell “surplus permits” to other firms).
39
Id. (“tradable permits—can achieve the same cost-minimizing
allocation of the control burden as a charge system.”)
40
In fact, this distinction is overdrawn. See Driesen, supra note 1, at
299. Traditional command-and-control regulation also operates by way of economic
incentives. Regulated entities comply with government rules precisely because they
have an economic incentive to do so in the form of fees or penalties that will be
assessed for noncompliance. Id. at 323. Conversely, so-called economic incentive
programs also depend on government command to a substantial degree—the command
to pay a tax at a certain rate or to refrain from polluting without a permit. See, e.g., id.
at 324 (explaining that an emissions trading program relies on government commands
limiting emissions); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a
Private Property Solution, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 533 (2007) (criticizing the distinction
and offering an alternative typology); Lesley C. Mcallister, Beyond Playing Banker:
The Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 274
(2007) (describing agency decisions about emission caps as a “basic component” of
trading). Moreover, the common assertion that our current constellation of federal
environmental statutes relies primarily on command-and-control regulation is
overstated. Most current regulation actually takes the form of performance standards,
which do not “command” the use of any particular technology but rather simply specify
a level of environmental performance that must be met to avoid penalties, leaving the
method of compliance to the individual firm. Driesen, supra note 2, at 297–98. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2000) (defining “standard of performance” as “a standard
for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation
achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which . . .
the [EPA] determines has been adequately demonstrated.”). See also PPG Indus., Inc.
v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981) (Standards of performance must be
“established only in the form of emissions limitations based on output, and not in the
form of work practice or operation requirements.”). In some instances, where
emissions are difficult to monitor, regulations impose work practice standard, which
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often lump work practice and performance standards together under the
pejorative term, “command-and-control regulation” (a term which
sounds like a reference only to work practice standards) while they laud
pollution taxes and emissions trading schemes as exemplars of a more
modern and enlightened “market-based” approach.41
To avoid
confusion and misleading pejorative terminology, we use the term
“traditional regulation” to refer to both performance standards and work
practice standards, rather than the term “command and control
regulation.”
As noted above, all of these regulatory mechanisms—whether
traditional or market-based—focus on the reduction of pollution outputs
rather than inputs.42 Nonetheless, with the exception of work practice
standards, all of these mechanisms give polluters discretion to choose
how to reduce those outputs.43 Accordingly, under a scheme of
pollution taxes, emissions trading or performance standards, a producer
can choose to achieve pollution output limits (or avoid pollution taxes)
by limiting inputs through pollution prevention measures rather than
installing end-of-the-pipe technologies.44 Under this approach the
decision to choose pollution prevention over end-of-the-pipe controls is
purely voluntary. Polluters will presumably limit inputs when such an
approach offers a cheaper option than end-of-the-pipe controls for
meeting a pollutant-specific output limit or avoiding a pollutant-specific
tax.
dictate the use of specific pollution control technologies, but such standards are the
exception rather than the rule. Driesen, supra note 2, at 299.
41
See, e.g. Keohane et al., supra note 1, at 313-14, Wiener, supra note
1, 679; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1.
42
See Gloria E. Helfland, Controlling Inputs to Control Pollution:
When Will it Work?, 19 ASS’N OF ENVTL. & NAT. RES. ECONOMISTS 13 (November,
1999) (the “theory of pollution taxes and permits has been developed primarily” in
terms of emissions or damages, rather than inputs).
43
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 11 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc) (output regulation leaves “[t]he method for achieving the required result . . .
entirely in the hands of the manufacturers”). In fact, even work practice standards offer
some flexibility, but this flexibility can be quite limited. The provisions authorizing
them direct EPA to accept alternative technologies that perform as well as the
technology required by a work practice standard. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(3)
(2000). But since EPA employs these standards when measurement is not feasible, see
e.g., id. § 7411(h)(1), such a demonstration may often prove difficult in practice.
Commentators usually associate emissions trading with pollution prevention,
but this association is somewhat misleading since traditional performance standards and
pollution taxes also can induce polluters to adopt pollution prevention as an alternative
to end-of-the-pipe controls. Moreover, experience has shown that emissions trading
programs, like other output-based regulations, often spur end-of-the-pipe control. See
infra notes 143 to 145 and accompanying text.
44
See Ochsner, supra note 15, at 596-98 (describing examples of
pollution prevention initiatives undertaken by firms in response to incentives created by
output-based regulation).
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C. Locating the Missing Instrument
While the vast literature on regulatory instrument choice has
generally focused on different ways of regulating outputs and paid little
attention to the alternative of regulating inputs, some of the economic
literature on pollution taxes has obliquely addressed this idea by focusing
on the choice between upstream and downstream taxes.45 The
distinction between upstream and downstream often correlates with the
distinction between inputs and outputs, but it need not necessarily do so.
A prime example of an upstream tax that arises frequently in the
literature on climate change is the idea of levying carbon taxes “at the
wellhead.”46 This would be a tax on inputs rather than outputs. Indeed,
since all goods ultimately rely upon inputs derived from natural
resources, moving upstream far enough inevitably brings one to the
question of inputs. But a partial move upstream can also simply involve
a move to an earlier pollution output along the production stream. Thus,
EPA has regulated both tailpipe emissions47 (downstream) and emissions
from petroleum refineries48 (further upstream). In any case, the tax
literature usually does not explicitly distinguish taxation of inputs from
taxation of outputs.49
While the idea of using taxes to directly regulate inputs has
received some attention, though oblique, in the academic literature, that
45

The environmental tax literature identifies the administrative
advantages of levying taxes upstream rather than downstream. See Andrea Baranzini et
al., A Future for Carbon Taxes, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 395, 406 (2000) (recognizing
that “upstream” carbon taxation will reduce monitoring costs); Frank Muller and J.
Andrew Hoerner, Greening State Energy Taxes: Carbon Taxes for Revenue and the
Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 5, 42 (1994) (noting that to simplify
enforcement it is “commonly proposed” that a carbon tax be levied at the point where
fossil fuels enter the economy, such as the wellhead, the mine mouth, or the dock). The
stream of production tends to begin with a narrow group of actors conducting a
particular type of process. But as we move upstream the variety of actors and processes
can multiply, thus increasing administrative costs associated with administering a
pollution tax. Indeed, in practice carbon taxes are almost always imposed upstream, on
the carbon content of fuels, rather than downstream on CO2 emissions. See Fanny
Missfeldt & Jochen Hauff, The Role of Economic Instruments, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 115, 135 (Anthony D. Owen & Nick Hanley, eds. 2004). As we
discuss in Part IIA, these advantages often apply to regulatory input limits (DILs) as
well.
46
See Muller & Hoerner, supra note 45, at 42.
47
See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000).
48
See 40 C.F.R. Part 60, subpart J.
49
Cf. Arild Vatn, Input versus Emission Taxes: Environmental Taxes in
a Mass Balance and Transaction Costs Perspective, 74 LAND ECON. 514 (1998); Walls
& Palmer, supra note 17, at 4, 10-11 (discussing possibility of taxing inputs rather than
polluting outputs).
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literature has generally ignored the idea of applying the other market
mechanism—trading—to inputs rather than outputs.50 As we discuss in
more detail in Section ID1, several recent papers have discussed the idea
of a cap and trade program limiting the carbon content of fossil fuel
inputs as a method for regulating carbon emissions. 51 But these papers
conceptualize these measures as a form of output regulation and are
narrowly focused on the context of climate change.52 They do not
50

In their classic article on instrument choice, Bohm and Russell
mention briefly in passing the possibility of regulating inputs rather than pollutant
outputs when the inputs “are perfectly correlated with the volume of pollutants
discharged and less costly for the government to monitor.” See Bohm & Russell, supra
note 1, at 443. Clearly, they view the idea as simply a proxy for measuring pollution
outputs that are difficult to monitor, rather than a fundamentally different approach to
pollution control regulation..
51
See Robert R. Nordhaus, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Feasibility of
Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 53, 57
(2007) (mentioning the possibility of “an upstream cap-and-trade program” regulating
“fuel producers, refiners, or transporters”); Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish,
Assessing the Options for Designing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 129-34 (2005); Jason Shogren, Climate
Protection: What Insight can Economics Offer?, in THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 57, 64 (Anthony d. Owen & Nick Hanley, eds. 2004) (mentioning choice
between upstream and downstream approach in designing carbon trading program);
Edwin Woerdman, Organizing Emissions Trading: The Barrier of Domestic Permit
Allocation, 28 ENERGY POLICY 613 (2000) (discussing upstream and downstream
approaches to designing international greenhouse gas trading program); Catherine
Boemare & Philippe Quiron, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe:
Lessons from Economic Literature and International Experiences, 43 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 213, 215 (2002) (discussing upstream and downstream approaches to designing
greenhouse gas trading programs); Robert N. Stavins, A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to
Address
Global
Climate
Change,
7
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/projects/hamiltonproject/Research-Commentary.aspx (2007)
(recommending imposition of an economy-wide cap on emissions “upstream” at the
point where fossil fuels are extracted, processed, or distributed); Robert R. Nordhaus &
Kyle W. Danish, Designing A Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program For The
U.S. iii (2003) [hereinafter Nordhaus & Danish, Pew Report] (describing an upstream
cap and trade program as requiring fossil fuel suppliers to “surrender allowances
equivalent to the carbon content of fossil fuels they distribute”), available at
http://www.pewclimatecenter.org (last visited June 13, 2007); Congressional Budget
Office, An Evaluation of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing U.S. Carbon
Emissions viii (2001) [hereinafter CBO Report] (discussing an “upstream program”
under which fuel producers and importers would have to hold allowances “based on the
carbon emissions that would be released when their fuel was combusted”), available at
http://www.cbo.org (last visited June 13, 2007); Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP),
U.S. Carbon Emissions Trading: Description of an Upstream Approach 1 (1998)
[hereinafter CCAP, Upstream Approach] (suggesting a DIL requiring fossil fuel
producers to “hold allowances for the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in their
fuels”), available at http://www.ccap.org (last visited June 13, 2007); see also Helfland,
supra note 4251 (discussing input taxes and tradable permit systems in a brief article
for a newsletter).
52
See infra note 61.
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recognize that input limits might be more generally conceptualized as a
distinct regulatory instrument nor do they systematically explore the full
potential of such an instrument.
Thus, a potentially significant regulatory instrument is missing
from the discussion on regulatory instrument choice. We call that
missing instrument “Dirty Input Limits” or “DILs.”53 A DIL is a
regulation that imposes a limit on the amount of an input allowed to be
produced or consumed. DILs can take several forms. Regulators can
limit the production of an input, or regulators can limit the amount of the
input that manufacturers or consumers can use. They can establish DILs
by simply imposing an input limit for each producer or user of a targeted
substance (performance standard DILs). Or they can create tradable
DILs.54
For example, a regulator could use a DIL to limit the amount of
oil used in the economy by requiring producers and importers of crude
Once the regulator introduced such
oil to hold allowances.55
production (or consumption) allowances, she could make them tradable,
thereby allowing one producer, the buyer, to extract more oil than the
allowance permitted if the producer paid another producer, the seller, to
extract less oil than the seller’s allowance permitted. Thus, it is possible
to create DILs in the form of either tradable or non-tradable quantitative
restrictions on inputs.
D. Examples of Dirty Input Limits
While DILs may lie hidden from scholars, they already exist in
practice and, indeed, have a proven track record. Congress currently has
bills before it to make a DIL variant part of the United States strategy to
53

The very term “emissions trading” may help explain the neglect of
DILs in the realm of quantitative mechanisms. This term focuses on pollution outputs
and leading scholars have explained the mechanism in terms of trading limits on
pollution outputs. Yet, scholars sometimes employ broader terms like “tradable
allowances” to refer to quantitative market-based mechanisms, in the place of narrower
“emissions trading” term. This broader terminology suggests awareness that trading
programs in practice do not focus solely on emissions, a term that, strictly speaking,
refers only to air pollution outputs. We have, for example, trading programs for water
pollution, wetlands, habitat conservation, and fishing. See Sinden, supra note 40, at –
(describing various types of trading programs).
54
See 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66730 (explaining how
such an approach could apply to CFC production limits)
55
See, CBO Report, supra note 51, at viii (“under an upstream
program” fossil fuel producers and importers would hold allowances); CCAP Upstream
Approach, supra note 5151, at 4 (suggesting a DIL requiring fossil fuel producers to
hold allowances for the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in their fuels).
Alternatively, a DIL could be imposed at some other point in the production stream, on
refineries or even consumer of gasoline.
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address global warming, and governments around the world have already
used them to achieve some of humanity’s most celebrated successes in
addressing environmental problems. The two most prominent historical
examples of the use of DILs will be familiar to every environmental law
or policy professional: the phase-out of chemicals depleting the
stratospheric ozone layer and the elimination of lead from gasoline. We
discuss the climate change, ozone depletion, and lead applications below.
1. Climate Change
As soon as policy makers began the work of designing regulatory
instruments to cut greenhouse gas emissions, they recognized that the
transportation sector posed particular problems. From the outset, most
proposals focused on cap-and-trade as the regulatory instrument of
choice.56 And for the substantial portion of GHG emissions that come
from electricity generation and large industrial plants, designing such a
system is relatively straightforward. Indeed, the most widely recognized
and successful prototype—the acid rain trading program—itself involved
emissions from power plants.57 Designing a similar system for carbon
dioxide emissions only requires minor tweaking.
But tackling the substantial portion of GHG emissions that come
out of the tailpipes of individual motor vehicles is far more
complicated.58 Involving every vehicle owner in a trading program
would be far too cumbersome to be practicable.59 Nor could one
effectively cap emissions by focusing on auto-manufacturers, since total
emissions is affected not only by factors like fuel efficiency that a car
manufacturer can address but also by factors outside the manufacturer’s
56

See Richard D. Morgenstern, U.S. Experiences with Domestic Climate
Policies 1990-20012: A Model for Future International Strategies? 2 (Climate Policy
Center, March 2003) [hereinafter Morgenstern, U.S. Experiences] (“, , , the principle
option for a mandatory policy to reduce U.S. carbon emissions is an emissions trading
system.”), available at: http://www.cpc-inc.org/assets/library/4_1morgenster.pdf. A
Sense of the Senate Resolution adopted as an amendment to the Energy Policy Act of
2005 on June 22, 2005, stated that “[i]t is the sense of the Senate that Congress should
enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory, market-based
limits and incentives on emissions of greenhouse gases.” See also Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, Report of Working Group III,
7.3.5 (2001) (“Many advocates prefer emissions trading [as the instrument for climate
change regulation]”), available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.htm.
57
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2000).
58
The same problems arise in designing a system to cover emissions
from small industrial sources as well as home heating using natural gas and oil. If a
regulation leaves these sources out, then regulation of electricity producers might
simply result in a shift from homeowners heating with electricity to heating w/oil or
natural gas.
59
See Stavins, supra note 51, at 20 (finding a downstream cap and trade
system infeasible, in part because of the need to regulate millions of vehicles).
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control, like the number of miles driven or the type of fuel used.
Because of this, existing cap-and-trade programs addressing climate
change leave out transportation, and therefore fail to cap economy-wide
emissions.60
The impossibility of capping transport emissions through output
controls, however, has pushed some policy makers to focus on inputs
rather than outputs in designing climate change regulation.61 A number
of policy analysts recommend an approach that would impose a cap on
the carbon content of fossil fuel inputs rather than on CO2 emissions as
they come out of the smoke stack or tail pipe.62 An input-based system
60

See, e.g., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI),
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/
[hereinafter RGGI MOU] (describing the Northeast region’s cap and trade system as
limited to electric utilities);.Council Directive 2003/87, Annex I, 2003 O.J. (L 275)
(listing sources regulated under the EU emissions trading scheme); B. Mortensen, The
EU Emissions Trading Directive, 14 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 277 (2004) (same);
Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007. See generally Note, The Compact Clause
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1958, 1959-1960
(2007) (describing the political process establishing RGGI); Rie Watanabe & Guy
Robinson, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 5 CLIMATE CHANGE 10
(2005) (describing the EU’s emissions trading scheme).
61
Since there is no end-of-the-pipe technology available to limit carbon
dioxide emissions from cars anyway, see Control of Emissions from New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52929 (Sept. 8, 2003) (“No technology
currently exists or is under development that can capture and destroy or reduce
emissions of CO2. . .”), an input-based approach to regulating greenhouse gas
emissions from the transportation sector involves a relatively minor conceptual shift.
Indeed, these proposals tend to still focus on outputs, treating limits on the carbon
content of fossil fuels as a kind of proxy for limits on carbon dioxide emissions. Thus,
none of the literature discussing such DIL-like regulation on carbon inputs has noted or
investigated the ancillary pollution control benefits that such an approach can provide
with respect to the other pollution outputs on the fossil fuel production streams. See
sources cited at note 51.
62
See Stavins, supra note 51, at 19 (recognizing that an “upstream”
trading approach “makes economy-wide coverage feasible.”); CCAP Upstream
Approach, supra note 51; Nordhaus & Danish, Pew Report, supra note 51;
Morgenstern, U.S. Experiences, supra note 56, at 3 (“[T]he strong efficiency
advantages of an upstream system suggest that if the United States is to achieve major
reductions in carbon emissions, it will ultimately need to rely on such a system.”);
Richard Morgenstern, Reducing Carbon Emissions and Limiting Costs (Resources for
the
Future,
Feb.,
2002),
available
at:
http://rff.org/rff/Core/Research_Topics/Air/McCainLieberman/loader.cfm?url=/commo
nspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=4482; CBO Report, supra note 51; Raymond Kopp,
Richard Morgenstern, William Pizer, & Michael Toman, A Proposal for Credible Early
Action on Climate Change (Resources for the Future, Feb. 1999) [hereinafter Kopp, et
al.,
A
Proposal],
available
at:
http://www.rff.org/rff/Publications/weathervane/Features/1999/A-Proposal-forCredible-Early-Action-in-US-Climate-Policy.cfm; Hidenori Niizawa, Tatsuyoshi Saijo
& Akinobu Yasumoto, Proposal of Upstream Emissions Trading in Japan (OECD
Global Forum on Sustainable Development, March, 2003), available at:
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that imposed a permit requirement on all petroleum refineries, oil
importers, natural gas pipelines and coal processors in the U.S. would
involve fewer than 2,000 entities in the permit market. 63 That is similar
to the number of facilities subject to the Clean Air Act’s acid rain trading
program.64
The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, which was voted
out of committee to the Senate floor on December 5, 2007,65 adopts a
hybrid approach, combining input-based and output-based systems.66
The Climate Security Act would impose an overall cap on emissions
from the electricity, industrial, commercial and transportation sectors of
the economy.67 With respect to major coal-fired power plants and other
industrial facilities, the program would work much like the successful
acid rain trading program under the 1990 Clean Air Act.68 EPA would
require each such facility to monitor the greenhouse gases escaping from
its smoke stacks and to hold a tradable allowance for each metric ton of
CO2 (or its equivalent) it emitted into the atmosphere.69 On the other
hand, the bill would addresses transportation sector emissions by
imposing limits on the production of the fossil fuels that will ultimately
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/28/2957725.pdf; Sen. Pete V. Domenici & Sen. Jeff
Bingaman, Design Elements of a Mandatory, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas
Regulatory System 4 (Feb. 2006) (“It is hard to see how greenhouse gas emissions from
the transportation sector could be addressed in a downstream permitting system.”),
available
at:
http://members.4cleanair.org/rc_files/3243/Domenici&Bingamanwhitepaper2-2-06.pdf;
Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal
Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of
the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship
Act, 45 Nat. Resources J. 865, 909-11 (2005); National Roundtable on the Environment
and the Economy, Getting to 2050: Canada's Transition to a Low-Emission Future 2425, available at http://www.nrtee-trnee.ca/eng/publications/getting-to-2050/intro-pagegetting-to-2050-eng.html (discussing the possibility of upstream cap-and-trade).
63
CCAP Upstream Approach, supra note 51, at 6.
64
See U.S.E.P.A., Acid Rain and Related Programs: 2006 Progress
Report 3 (2006) (“The [acid rain trading] program affected 3,520 electric generating
units . . . in 2006 (with most emissions produced by 1062 coal-fired units).”), available
at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/docs/2006-ARP-Report.pdf.
65
See Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007);
66
See Tim Hargrave, An Upstream/Downstream Hybrid Approach to
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading (Center for Clean Air Policy, June, 2000), available
at: http://www.ccap.org/pdf/Hybrid1.PDF; Jan Mazurek, Cap Carbon Emissions Now
(Progressive
Policy
Institute,
June
2002),
available
at:
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=116&subsecID=149&contentID=25
1136;
67
This cap would cover emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, and perfluorocarbons. A separate cap would cover
emissions of hydrofluorcarbons.
68
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2000).
69
See Climate Security Act, §§ 4(7)(A), (B), 1202(a)(1).

March 4, 2008 Draft

THE MISSING INSTRUMENT

20

lead to greenhouse gas emissions. The bill would require producers and
importers of petroleum and coal-based transportation fuels to hold an
allowance for each unit of fuel sold for use in the transportation sector
that would produce one metric ton of CO2 when combusted.70 Limiting
the amount of carbon in oil is equivalent to limiting the amount of oil
itself, since carbon is the primary constituent of oil and the carbon
content of oil is essentially unchangeable.71 This cap-and-trade program,
then, would operate like any other DIL, limiting the quantity of the input
flowing through the entire production stream.72
Because the Climate Security Act employs a hybrid approach,
producers can escape the restraint on fossil fuel production by
purchasing credits reflecting end-of-the-pipe approaches outside the
transportation sector. Additionally, under the Act’s offset provisions,
they can satisfy up to 15 percent of their compliance obligation through
the purchase of offsets from carbon sequestration achieved through
Still, the DIL idea has
altered agriculture or forestry practices.73
powerfully influenced this pending climate change legislation as well as
numerous other proposals for climate change regulation.74 Indeed,
because of the logistical difficulties associated with monitoring
emissions from millions of individual tailpipes, capping emissions on an
economy-wide basis is impossible without employing at least some
elements of the DIL idea.
Similarly, Governor Schwarzeneger has employed a DIL to
address carbon emissions in the transport sector. He has promulgated an
executive order calling for a 10% reduction in the carbon intensity of
California’s transportation fuels by 2020.75 This order authorizes fossil

70

See id. at §§ 4(7)(C), 1202(a)(2).
See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., The Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives
Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29 TULSA L. REV. 485, 488 (1994) (noting that
“nearly all petroleum is 83-86 percent carbon).
72
Drawing on the literature on upstream and downstream taxes,
analysts typically refer to schemes like these that impose limits on the production and
importation of fossil fuels as “upstream cap and trade programs,” highlighting the fact
that such programs impose regulation early in the production stream rather than at the
point of end use. See supra note 51. The focus remains on limiting the final polluting
output of the production stream, CO2 emissions, with the carbon content of fuel viewed
as a proxy for subsequent greenhouse gas emissions. But, as explained above, because
the carbon content of oil is unchangeable, these schemes actually limit the amount of
oil in the economy and are therefore DILs.
73
See Climate Stewardship Act, § 2403.
74
See supra note 62.
75
Cal. Exec. Order S-01-07, § 1; Alexander E. Farrell et al., A LowCarbon Standard for California Part 2: Policy Analysis (2007), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/low_carbon_fuel_standard/ (providing a detailed policy
analysis).
71
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fuel providers to trade carbon intensity allowances.76 While his
executive order does not cap total carbon emissions because it does not
limit the overall amount of fuel used, it does use a DIL to reduce fuel’s
carbon content.
2. Ozone Depletion
In the 1970s, scientists discovered that chlorine-based
compounds tend to destroy ozone.77 They hypothesized that emissions
of these compounds could therefore destroy the ozone layer in the upper
atmosphere, which protects us from ultraviolet radiation.78 This
destruction could elevate skin cancer rates,79 interfere with immune
systems,80 and wreak ecological havoc.81
Regulating outputs of ozone depleting chemicals posed daunting
challenges. Society used ozone depleters in a wide variety of processes,
as industrial solvents in many different manufacturing processes (e.g.
aerospace and electronics);82 as coolants in air conditioners and
refrigerators;83 as propellants in fire extinguishers, asthmatics’ inhalers,
and spray deodorants;84 and as an ingredient in styrophone cups and
76

See id. § 4 (allowing transportation fuel refiners, blenders, producers,
and importers to earn credits for exceeding carbon intensity targets to sell to
undercompliers).
77
Self-Pressurized Containers; Warning Statements, 41 Fed. Reg.
52071, 52072-73 (1976) (summarizing the findings of a 1976 National Academy of
Sciences study of ozone depletion).
78
Id. at 52072 (explaining the chemical reaction that destroys ozone).
79
Id. at 52073 (predicting “increased incidence” of various forms of
skin cancer from ozone depletion); Self-Pressurized Consumer Products Containing
Chlorofluorocarbon Propellants, 42 Fed. Reg. 21807, 21808 (1977) (stating that the
Consumer Product Safety Commission has “made a preliminary finding that” certain
propellants present an unreasonable risk of injury from increased skin cancer);
Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11304 (summarizing a 1977
National Academy of Science report on skin cancer incidence).
80
Ozone Meeting, 49 Fed. Reg. 30823, 30824 (1984) (a National
Academy of Sciences study suggests a link between ozone depletion and “depression of
the general human immune responsive system”).
81
1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66728 (describing specific
ecological effects and stating that “these and other environmental effects” could be
“more serious” than the human health effects).
82
See Fully Halogenated Chlorofluorocarbons, 43 Fed. Reg. 11318,
11318 (1978) (suggesting that uses of CFCs as solvents and blowing agents constitutes
a substantial portion of non-aerosol production).
83
See id. at 11318 (stating that about one-half of non-aerosol CFC use
involved use as refigerants).
84
See Self-Pressurized Containers; Warning Statements, 41 Fed. Reg. at
52071 (stating that “Chlorofluorocarbons are widely used as propellants”); Assessment
of Carbon Tetrachloride as a Potentially Toxic Pollutant, 50 Fed. Reg. 32621, 32621
(1985) (stating that carbon tetrachloride has been used as a “fire extinguishing agent”);
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foams85. Limiting the emissions from all of these processes and uses
appeared extremely difficult.
Accordingly, the parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer86 (Montreal Protocol) agreed to DILs,
limits on the inputs of ozone depleting substances, rather than limits on
the emission of ozone depleting substances into the atmosphere.87 These
particular DILs limited and eventually phased out the consumption of
ozone depleting chemicals.88
The Montreal Protocol committed
developed countries to significant reductions in consumption of leading
ozone depleting substances.89 Subsequent amendments to the Montreal
Protocol went further, eventually phasing out the consumption of the
most important ozone-depleters entirely.90
The parties to the Montreal Protocol accomplished this phase-out
of consumption through restrictions on production of the chemicals. The
Montreal Protocol defines a country’s consumption of an ozone
depleting chemical as the quantity of its production minus exports plus
imports.91 This approach made it much easier to track progress toward
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Manufacture of Halon Blends, Intentional Release
of Halon, Technician Training and Disposal of Halon and Halon-Containing
Equipment, 63 Fed. Reg. 11084, 10085 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Halon Rule]
(explaining that halons are ozone depleting substances used in fire suppression).
85
See Assessment of Chorofluorocarbon-113 as a Potentially Toxic
Pollutant, 50 Fed. Reg. 24313, 24313 (1985) (describing the blowing of foam as one of
several principal uses of CFC-113).
86
Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29.
87
In this case, the inputs and the outputs were actually the same
chemical substance. This is a bit unusual, as many processes using chemicals produce
outputs different in form from the inputs, although usually related. But, for the most
part, the regulatory limits did not apply to the outputs. The relevant law did not take
the form of emission limits, nor did government enforce most of these laws at the point
where the chemicals were released in the environment. Rather they were enforced and
drafted as input limits, specifically as limits on the production and importation of ozone
depleting substances, as described below.
88
See, e.g. Protection of Statospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30566
(1988) codified at 40 C.F.R. part 82 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Reduction] (reducing
production of certain CFCs by first 50 and then 80% and capping the production of
other CFC at existing levels under the Montreal Protocol); Protection of Stratospheric
Ozone, 58 Fed. Reg. 65018, 65019, codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 82 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 Phaseout] (pointing out that the Montreal Protocol as amended requires a
phaseout of CFCs by 1996).
89
See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, art. 2(4) (requiring a 50%
cut in certain ozone depleting substances beginning in 1998).
90
See, e.g., London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, June 29,
1990, arts. 2A(5), art. 5, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-9, 30 I.L.M. 537 (requiring that
developed countries reduce consumption of certain ozone depleters to zero by the year
2000 and generally requiring developing country compliance ten years later),
91
See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 3 n. 1 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (citing art. 1, sec. 6 of the Montreal Protocol).
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meeting national commitments to phase-out consumption. It meant that
measurement occurred upstream, at the point of production, rather than
downstream, at the point of consumption. Instead of having to measure
the use of ozone depleting chemicals downstream in myriad consumer
products and manufacturing processes, regulators simply had to monitor
the handful of facilities actually manufacturing ozone depleting inputs
along with the volume of imports and exports. 92 Thus, the Montreal
Protocol employed DILs to first limit and then phase-out ozone depleting
substances.
In addition, the Montreal Protocol provided for some trading of
DILs.93 Specifically, it provided that countries could meet their
consumption limits jointly. This provision suggested that one country
could over-comply if it paid another country to under-comply. Similarly,
the United States law implementing the Montreal Protocol allowed
producers to trade their production allowances.94 While these provisions
apparently produced no actual trading, their existence reveals the
possibility of tradable DILs.
Scholars recognize the phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals as
the major, some say the only, example of successful international
environmental protection.95 While a hole in the ozone layer opened up
as the regime began to operate, developed countries phased out many of
the principal substances of concern and developing countries began to
follow suit. As a result, scientists now expect the ozone layer to heal.96
Prior to the regimes’ enactment, many considered such drastic action
impractical.97 They believed that finding substitutes for many of these
products was impossible or too costly. In fact, however, the phase-out
stimulated the substitution of new inputs for the old ones, many of which

92

See 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30579 (stating
that the phaseout was relatively easy to administer, because the producers and importers
were relatively few in number).
93
See 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30588
(discussing and interpreting the Protocol’s “industrial rationalization” provision)
94
See 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30567.
95
See, e.g., EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER:
SCIENCE AND STRATEGY vii (2003) (claiming that the ozone depletion regime
constitutes the only example of successful international environmental law).
96
See Daniel Pruzin, U.N. Agency Report Says Ozone Hole Above
Antarctic Shows Signs of Shrinking, 30 INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) 686 (Sept. 5, 2007)
(World Meteorological Organization expects ozone hole to disappear “sometime
between 2065 and 2070”).
97
See Parson, supra note 95, at 9 ("[B]efore regime formation . .
. it was widely believed that significant cuts in ozone depleting chemicals would be
difficult and costly, and likely dangerous as well.").
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proved cheaper than the ozone depleting substances they replaced.98
Some of the substitutes produce environmental risks. For example, some
manufacturers substituted a toxic solvent for more stable ozone depleters
phased out under the Montreal Protocol.99 The dangers posed by this
toxic solvent, however, are arguably less severe than the risks associated
with stratospheric ozone depletion. And in many cases producers
avoided any significant risk by substituting soap and water for ozone
depleting substances.100
3. Lead in Gasoline
While DILs have emerged in just the last two decades in
connection with efforts to address the hole in the ozone layer and climate
change, the history of DILs actually goes back at least as far as the
history of modern environmental law. In fact, Congress authorized DILs
in one of the first major pieces of federal environmental legislation ever
passed—the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments.101 The Clean Air Act
generally focuses a lot of attention on output limits, such as emission
standards for tailpipe emissions and pollution from smokestacks.102 But
Congress also gave EPA the authority to limit fuel additives or
constituents, i.e. the inputs into gasoline.103 It did this with a particular
health hazard in mind, the hazard posed by use of lead as a gasoline
additive.104
EPA responded by first limiting the amount of lead that could be
used as an input into gasoline and later phasing it out.105 The early
stages of the phase-out simply required reductions in the amount of lead
98

See, e.g., Fully Halogenated Chlorofluorocarbons, 43 Fed. Reg. at
11319 (predicting that consumers stand to benefit financially from the use of cheaper
propellants than those that deplete the ozone layer).
99
See PARSON, supra note 95, at 182.
100
See ID. at 4 (noting that production and use of ozone-depleting
chemicals has fallen 95% with only modest associated cost); David M. Driesen, Does
Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,094,
10,103 (2003); David Lee, Trading Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 31, 33 (Elizabeth Cook ed., 1996).
101
See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §
211(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1676, 1698, codified at 42 U.S.C. §7545(c)(1) (2000).
102
See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7521 (2000).
103
See ARNOLD W. REITZE JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW:
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 326 (Envtl. L. Inst. 2001); Reitze, supra note 71.
104
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C.Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“It
is beyond question that the fuel additive Congress had in mind [in CAA §211(c)(1)(A)]
was lead.”); Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 281, 294 (2004) (stating that Congress empowered EPA to remove lead from
gasoline, because it interfered with catalytic converters).
105
See Reitze, supra note 71 at 500-05 (providing a detailed history of
the progression of lead additive standards).
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in gasoline, a performance standard type DIL.106 Later, however, EPA
allowed gasoline producers to trade their DILs.107 Unlike in the
Montreal Protocol case, a significant amount of trading did occur. EPA
employed trading of the lead DILs to enhance the flexibility of the
phase-out and, in particular, to try to ease, or at least delay, the potential
burden on small refiners.108
The Clean Air Act generally requires EPA to write National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to protect public health from
ubiquitous dangerous pollutants.109 EPA set a NAAQS for lead,
establishing an atmospheric concentration that in its view would
adequately protect public health,110 and relied on DILs for lead in
gasoline to achieve the NAAQS. Primarily as a result of the lead DILs,
every populous region in the country has achieved the NAAQS for
lead.111 By contrast, for most other pollutants EPA has relied primarily
upon state and federal output limits to achieve the NAAQS. While some
regions have achieved the non-lead NAAQS, many areas still have not
achieved the NAAQS for the most ubiquitous pollutants more than 35
years after the Clean Air Act’s enactment.112
106

Id. at 500 (describing an early DIL as providing for an average
concentration of 1.7 grams of lead per gallon (gpg), decreasing to .5 gpg by 1979).
107
See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead Rights,
50 Fed. Reg. 13116, 13119 (1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. part 80); Suzi Kerr & Richard
Newell, Policy-Induced Technological Adoption: Evidence from the U.S. Lead
Phasedown, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 317, (2003)
108
See Driesen, supra note 1, at 317 n. 131 (explaining in detail how
banking of lead credits lead to delays in reducing emissions). See generally Morris &
Stewart, supra note 22, at 1025 (describing lead trading as a means of buying off small
refiners).
109
See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 463 (2001).
110
See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (Oct 5, 1978); Lead Industries Assoc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(upholding the lead NAAQS).
111
See EPA, REPORT ON AIR QUALITY IN NONATTAINMENT AREAS FOR
2003-2005 COVERING OZONE, PARTICULATE MATTER, CARBON MONOXIDE, SULFUR
DIOXIDE, NITROGEN DIOXIDE, AND LEAD: TECHNICAL SUMMARY 24-26 (2006) (revised
2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/values.html (last visited, June 12,
2007) [hereinafter nonattainment report]. As of 2007, EPA had designated only two
areas with a combined population of about 4600 people as not having met the lead
standard. Id. at 25. A third area, Delaware County, Indiana, has recent monitoring data
indicating a violation of the lead standard, but has not yet been designated as violating
the standard. Id.
112
See NONATTAINMENT REPORT, supra note 111, at 6-7, 15, 20-21, 23
(listing areas violating the NAAQS for ozone, particulate both fine, PM2.5, and coarse,
PM10, and carbon monoxide). In 2004-2005, all designated nonattainment areas for
carbon monoxide attained the standard, but one previously compliant area violated it.
Id. at 22-23. Because air quality can fluctuate from year to year, EPA generally
requires several clean years before declaring that an area has attained an air quality
standard.
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The lead phase-out constitutes a public health triumph, having
greatly reduced blood lead levels, which correlate with neurological
disorders.113 Because EPA reduced lead through input limits, rather than
tailpipe controls, the lead phase-out also prevented lead poisoning of
workers at plants manufacturing lead additives.114 Some of the
substitutes for lead are toxic and pose some risks of their own, but the
evidence of the harms associated with lead is generally much more
robust than the evidence of harm from the substitutes.115 And the federal
government has continued to employ DILs to address harms associated
with substitutes for lead and other constituents of gasoline.116 While
some significant sources of lead remain unabated, the DILs phasing lead
out of gasoline provide one of environmental law’s most striking success
stories.
II. Evaluating DILs.
This part discusses DILs’ advantages and disadvantages. This
discussion not only lays the groundwork for policy-makers’
consideration of DILs in particular cases, it also establishes that DILs
have distinct features that merit further discussion and analysis.
A. Advantages
1. Administrative Advantages
DILs’ considerable administrative advantages may have played a
large role in motivating policy makers to use them to regulate ozone
depleting chemicals and lead. Sometimes DILs can prove feasible when

113

Id. at 24 (reporting a 78% decline in blood lead levels and noting the
link between lead and seizures, mental retardation, and behavioral disorders).
114
See Reitze, supra note 71, at 497-98 (explaining that when lead was
first introduced it killed or severely poisoned 80 percent of the 49 workers at one
processing plant). See also Jamie Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, 270
THE NATION 11, 22-25 (Mar. 20, 2000).
115
Professor McGarity states that we have a “dearth of health effects”
data on MTBE, the most controversial lead substitute that manufacturers chose. See
McGarity, supra note 104, at 284, 288, 295. He concludes that in spite of the risks
posed by lead substitutes, we are better off with the lead ban than we would be without
it. Id. at 311-12. Furthermore, he points out that we would be still better off if EPA
had used its authority properly to address MTBE early on. Id. at 312. Cf. Reitze,
supra note 71, at 491 (stating that “it could be claimed that” the replacement of lead
with aromatic compounds have made fuels “more environmentally harmful.”).
116
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f)(2) (2000). See also MTBE Proposed
Ban, supra note 21.
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output regulation is not.117 Even where output regulation is also feasible,
DILs can provide significant administrative cost savings.
The administrative advantages of DILs stem from three sources.
First, it is often simpler to monitor inputs than outputs. Indeed, in some
instances, monitoring outputs is simply impossible. This is true of ozone
depleting chemicals, for example. Ozone depleters get released into the
atmosphere as “fugitive emissions,” i.e. emissions escaping at multiple
places in a production processes or after use of a product.118 Monitoring
these emissions was impracticable both because of measurement
problems and because of the large number of heterogeneous sites
potentially requiring monitoring.
By contrast, monitoring the
production, imports, and exports of ozone depleting substances in order
to administer a DIL was relatively straightforward. Accordingly, the
parties to the Montreal Protocol chose DILs to address ozone depletion
in part to avoid the monitoring problems that made output regulation
impracticable.119
In other instances, monitoring outputs is feasible, but more
expensive than monitoring inputs. For example, monitoring the amount
of coal burned by a power plant is undoubtedly cheaper and less
complicated than monitoring the amounts of various pollutants escaping
from the smoke stack.120
Second, because a DIL can simultaneously reduce a whole series
of pollution outputs along a production stream, it can reduce
administrative costs by obviating the need for separate regulatory
programs for each polluting output.121 Thus, a DIL limiting or phasing
out oil consumption, for example, might eliminate or reduce the need for
regulatory programs to minimize the impacts of drilling, to prevent
spills, to limit the emissions of hazardous air pollutants, particulate
matter, and smog precursors from oil refineries,122 to prevent leaks from

117

See, e.g., Fully Halogenated Chlorofluroalkanes, 42 Fed. Reg. at
21547 (finding a prohibition on the manufacture of fully halogenated
chlorofluoroalkane propellants the “only practicable regulatory alternative.”).
118
Cf. Morriss & Stewart, supra note 22, at 1041-42 (describing fugitive
emissions associated with oil refining).
119
See supra notes 82 to 92 and accompanying text.
120
See Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap-and-Trade
Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10330, 10331 (2001).
121
See Stavins, supra note 51, at 20 (explaining that an upstream
regulation point reduces administrative costs). Cf. Mcallister, supra note 40, at 304-305
(discussing how the RECLAIM emissions trading program generated high
administrative costs, even though it only addressed two pollutants).
122

See 40 C.F.R. part 63 (2006).
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underground storage tanks at service stations,123 to require vapor
recovery devices at service stations,124 to impose standards for an array
of different pollutants from vehicles,125 and to require periodic
inspections of vehicle emission control systems.126 Of course, the scope
and stringency of a DIL affects the extent to which that DIL obviates the
need for other regulatory programs.127
Third, DILs will often allow government to realize administrative
cost savings by moving the locus of regulation upstream.128 The
environmental tax literature has observed that upstream taxes generally
have lower administrative costs than downstream taxes,129 and the same
observation holds true for upstream DILs.130 A supply chain often
123

See MTBE Proposed Ban, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16100-101 (describing the
regulations seeking, with limited to success, to eliminate leaks from underground
storage tanks); McGarity, supra note 104, at 292-94 (same).
124
See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6
Envtl. Lawyer 309, 319-20 (2000) (discussing regulation requiring vapor recovery
devices).
125
See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000) (directing EPA to regulate emissions
from motor vehicles).
126
See Clean Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F. Supp 2d 705, 708-09
(E.D.Pa. 2002) (discussing Pennsylvania’s obligation to implement vehicle inspection
and maintenance program under Clean Air Act).
127
DILs reduce administrative costs by obviating the need for multiple
regulatory programs most obviously when the DIL phases out an input. Such a DIL
may eliminate the need for a lot of output-based regulation entirely. When a DIL only
limits production of an input, the relationship between the DIL and avoided cost will be
more subtle and complex. For example, imagine a DIL limiting gasoline consumption
by 10%. Society probably would continue to require output regulation of vehicle
exhaust, even if gasoline use dropped. The DIL, however, would contribute to
something like a 10% decline in vehicle exhaust. In principle, the regulator could now
reduce the control efficiency of the vehicle exhaust regulations in response in order to
save money. This would imply that the DIL produced a cost savings in vehicle exhaust
regulation. Of course, the regulator might instead keep the regulation in tact. If so, the
DIL would produce an additional benefit which would help justify it.
128
See, e.g., 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30579
(finding that engineering controls would be “difficult to administer” because thousands
of firms use CFCs).
129
See supra note 45.
130
See Arnold W. Reitze, Should the Clean Air Act be Used to Turn
Petroleum Addicts into Alcoholics?, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10745, 10746
(2006) (fuel additive requirements are relatively easy to enforce because of the
centralization of refining and distribution); CBO Report, supra note 51, at viii (claiming
that an “upstream” allowance requirement minimizes the government’s administrative
cost); Hargrave, supra note 66, at 6 (noting that an upstream approach “would be more
workable that a downstream system because it would include fewer regulated . . .
entities.”); CCAP, Upstream Approach, supra note 51, at 6-7 (finding an upstream
approach to carbon trading “more workable” than a downstream approach, because it
would regulate far fewer sources). For trading programs, however, the number of
actors must remain large enough to create a viable market if trading’s cost saving
potential is to be realized. See Catherine Boemare & Philippe Quiron, Implementing
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begins with a small number of homogeneous actors producing
fundamental inputs, but ends in products used by numerous
heterogeneous businesses or consumers. When this is true, imposing an
upstream DIL will generate administrative cost savings.
Accordingly, DILs may have great utility even when output
limits or taxes are feasible.131 Governments have limited resources
available for regulating and monitoring pollution.132 Using these
resources efficiently can be very important to realizing environmental
goals.133
2. Efficiency Advantages
Because output regulation focuses on each polluting output in
isolation, it can fail to take into account benefits attributable to
reductions in other pollution outputs along the same production stream.
This can result in an inefficient choice of pollution reduction strategies.
By broadening the focus of analysis to the production stream as a whole,
DILs tend to reduce such inefficiencies.
Where an environmental problem stems from a single production
process producing a single polluting output, a DIL might prove
inefficient to the extent that it limits a polluter’s choices with respect to
what kind of pollution control strategy to employ. An output-based
regulation allows the polluter a choice of complying either through the
adoption of end-of-the-pipe controls or through pollution prevention
(changing or reducing inputs).134 A DIL, on the other hand, requires the
polluter to adopt pollution prevention strategies.135 Where end-of-thepipe controls offer a cheaper method for reducing the single polluting
output, a DIL will prove inefficient.136
Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe: Lessons from Economic Literature and
International Experiences, 43 Ecological Econ. 213, 215 (2002) (large number of
participants required for successful emissions trading program in order for market to
benefit from significant abatement cost differences among firms and to lower the risk of
monopolistic manipulation); Bohm & Russell, supra note 1, at 422-23 (same).
131
See, e.g., 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66729-30 (listing
possible out-based technologies for limiting CFC emissions, but concluding that growth
in CFC use could offset gains made with an output-based approach).
132
See 53 Fed. Reg. at 30579 (EPA could not possibly regulate 5,000 to
10,000 CFC customers, because of resource limitations).
133
See id. (regulating CFC customers was not feasible).
134
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
135
See CCAP, Upstream Approach, supra note 51, at 2 an upstream
trading program provides no incentive to use “end use emission treatment
technologies”).
136
Robert Stavins, in advancing an upstream cap and trade approach,
argues that the point of regulation does not influence the cost of reductions. Stavins,
supra note 51, at 18. Stavins makes this point in the context of a proposal that mixes
upstream and downstream regulation, rather than a pure DIL. See id. at 17-18
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More often than not, however, the input that contributes to an
environmental problem is part of a production stream that produces
multiple pollution outputs. In the context of a pollution stream, the
efficiency analysis is quite different. In that case, DILs will often offer
efficiency advantages over output-based regulation.
A highly simplified hypothetical example will help to
demonstrate the point. Imagine that an electric power plant is faced with
output-based regulation requiring it to reduce its sulfur dioxide emissions
by half. Imagine that the cost of switching half its generating capacity to
wind power is $10 million and the cost of installing scrubbers is $4
million. Clearly, the power plant will choose to install scrubbers rather
than switch to wind power, because that option involves the least cost to
the power plant. Yet, for society as a whole, the benefits associated with
decreasing coal production (reduced deaths and injuries to coal miners,
reduced ecological destruction from mining) might well outweigh the
extra $6 million cost associated with the switch to wind power.137 In
such a case, the pollution prevention strategy of switching to wind power
would clearly be better for society as a whole. Hence, plants acting cost
effectively with respect to a particular output-based regulation, may not
be acting efficiently with respect to the full range of externalities
associated with a production stream.
Under output-based regulation, polluters usually base their
pollution control strategy choices on an incomplete accounting of costs
and benefits that fails to take into account the full social benefits that
would accrue from a pollution prevention strategy’s reduction of other
polluting outputs along the production stream. If all of the externalities
associated with those outputs were fully internalized through perfectly
efficient output-based regulation, then the power plant’s decision about
what pollution control strategy to pursue would reflect the full range of
relevant social costs and benefits, because the social harms caused by
coal mining would be internalized into the price of coal. But
comprehensive regulation of all relevant pollution outputs at the same
(proposing a credit for post-combustion emission reductions, such as through carbon
capture and storage). And he may be correct in that context. But he acknowledges, in a
footnote, that the point of regulation can make a difference in some cases. Id. n. 23. A
pure DIL would not provide a credit for an end-of-the-pipe emission reduction option,
and therefore could prove more costly in the short-term with respect to a single
pollutant with high input control costs and low output control costs. While a pollution
tax may impose uniform cost regardless of the point of imposition, see id. (trying to
support a conclusion about regulation by reference to basic textbook economics of tax
policy), regulatory costs can vary with the point of imposition.
137
John M. Broder, Rule to Expand Mountain Top Coal Mining, N.Y.
Times A1 (August 23, 2007) (discussing mountaintop removal’s ecological impacts);
Cara Buckley and Susan Saulny, Finding Miners Alive is "Totally Unlikely," Owner
Says, N.Y. Times A12 (August 23, 2007); Ravaging Appalachia, N.Y. Times A 17
(August 27, 2007) (editorial discussing mountaintop removal’s ecological effects).
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time usually proves beyond the capacity of government. Often
governments leave some pollution unregulated,138 or they leave
regulation that does exist unenforced.139 And even when they attempt to
regulate comprehensively, they almost always regulate one type of
pollutant at a time.140 This makes it impossible for industry to have
complete compliance cost information at any one time that might justify
investments in whole new approaches to avoid multiple regulatory
impacts. Accordingly, in a second-best world of incomplete
internalization of externalities, output-based regulation, with its
piecemeal focus on individual polluting outputs, may produce inefficient
results.141 By expanding the field of vision to encompass an entire
production stream, DILs may often produce more efficient results for
society as a whole.
Because commentators usually associate emissions trading with
pollution prevention,142 one might think that output-based trading solves
the problem of polluters choosing options with only narrowly defined
benefits. In fact, however, polluters even under trading often choose
end-of-the-pipe control when it’s cheaper than pollution prevention at
realizing reductions in the pollutants the program targets. This helps
explain why almost two-thirds of the credits generated in developing
countries for trading in carbon markets created by the Kyoto Protocol
have come from end-of-the-pipe controls, which have been cheaper than
138

See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A
Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (2003).
139
See Durwood Zaelke, Matthew Stillwell, & Oran Young,
Compliance, Rule of Law , and Good Governance in MAKING LAW WORK:
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 47-51 (Durwood
Zaelke, et al., eds. 2005) (discussing pervasive problem on under-enforcement of
environmental laws throughout the world); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage
Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 297 (1999) (same).
140
Typically, separate statutes govern pollution in different media.
Thus, at the federal level in the U.S., the Clean Air Act regulates air pollution, 42
U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2000), the Clean Water Act regulates water pollution, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 et seq. (2000), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulates solid
waste disposal, 42 U.S.C. § 6902 et seq. (2000).
141
See MTBE Proposed Ban, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16100 (justifying a ban on
MTBE in part because numerous government programs to prevent gasoline leaks and
spills “from the vast array of units and individuals handling gasoline” could not prevent
releases into the environment).
142
See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 155, 166 (1988) (noting that
technology-based regulation requires installation of “pollution control” technology,
while “economic incentives” encourage “new products or production technologies”);
Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15
J.L. & COM. 585, 592 (1996) (contrasting the “existing technology-based system[’s]”
emphasis on “end of pipe” controls with trading’s encouragement of “process changes
and conservation”).
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using renewable energy as a substitute for dirty inputs.143 Similarly,
while polluters subject to traditional performance standard regulation
have sometimes complied by employing pollution prevention options not
anticipated by regulators,144 they have more often complied by using
“end-of-the-pipe” controls. This suggests that pollution prevention is not
always cheap.145 Output-based regulation makes input reduction
voluntary and generally induces it only when it offers a relatively cheap
way of meeting a narrowly defined goal.
3. Fundamental Change and Innovation
We have already alluded to DIL’s ability to stimulate innovation.
But the idea that DILs may perform better than the alternatives in
stimulating innovation requires elaboration.
And the underlying
assumption that innovation has more value than a beneficial noninnovative approach will receive some attention as well.
We define innovation as a non-obvious departure from prior
approaches.146 Innovation includes not just invention, but also use of a
new technology. One can distinguish innovation from diffusion, the
spread of well understood practices.
Technological changes, whether innovative or not, can either
involve incremental improvements in existing approaches or a
fundamental change in how society produces, uses, and delivers goods
and services. Thus, for example, minor changes in the constituents of
gasoline to improve its environmental characteristics constitute
incremental change. A decision to make vehicles that run on electricity
rather than gasoline, on the other hand, involves a fundamental change.
Fundamental changes alter multiple steps in a production stream and
143

See David M. Driesen, Market Liberalism and Sustainable
Development’s Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83
INDIANA L. J. 1 , __(2008) (forthcoming) (characterizing 64% of credits as coming from
end-of-the-pipe control). The data supporting this conclusion come from Joergen
Fenhann, UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, CDM Pipeline
Overview
(July
2007),
available
at
http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/
CDMpipeline.xls and the website updates this data frequently.
144
See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GAUGING
CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH—AN APPRAISAL OF OSHA’S ANALYTICAL APPROACH, OTA-ENV-635, 57-58
(1995) (discussing examples of pollution prevention measures in response to outputbased standards).
145
See Ochsner, supra note 12, at 591; Nicholas A. Ashford & George
R. Heaton Jr., Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 139-140 (Summer 1983).
146
Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)(patentable invention must be non-obvious
departure from prior art).
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may also affect what the end consumer does. So, for example, a shift to
electric vehicles would eliminate gasoline use, thereby reducing refinery
emissions, oil spills, and so on, but conversely increase electricity use,
thereby raising power plant emissions. It might also change what
consumers do, relieving them of the responsibility to go to gasoline
stations while requiring them to plug in a car overnight and perhaps take
shorter trips. While the line between fundamental and incremental
change will not always be as sharp as these examples suggest, the
distinction will prove useful in evaluating DILs.
In general, pollution prevention is more likely to involve
fundamental technological change than end-of-the-pipe controls.
Because pollution prevention reduces or eliminates inputs, it involves
making changes to the production process itself.
End-of-the-pipe
technology, on the other hand, tends not to alter existing processes
significantly, but instead consists of an add-on. Under output-based
regulation, firms can choose whether to meet regulatory standards
through pollution prevention or end-of-the-pipe controls,147 and
frequently they choose the latter. Since DILs require firms to use
pollution prevention techniques rather than end-of-the-pipe controls,
DILs tend to produce more fundamental change and more innovation
than output-based regulation.148 The magnitude of the fundamental
change will depend upon the stringency of the DIL,149 but a DIL
focusing on a fundamental input like gasoline will always produce some
fundamental change. By contrast, emission limits tend not to produce
fundamental changes unless they are so stringent and expensive that they
make existing approaches non-viable.
Scholars have recognized that the phase-outs of lead and ozone
depleting chemicals stimulated innovations.150 In fact, both of these
147

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
As between output-based regulatory instruments, emissions trading
tends to spur even less fundamental change than performance standards, as one of us
has shown in several previous articles. See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and
Innovation, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LESSONS FROM
20 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad eds. 2006); Driesen,
supra note 96. This is because fundamental change is often costly, and emissions
trading favors the least costly approaches.
149
See, e.g., 1993 Phaseout, supra note 88, at 65025 (predicting that
acceleration of a phaseout schedule for ozone depleting substances would accelerate
technological development).
150
See, e.g., PARSON, supra note 92, at 184, 186, 188, 190 (discussing
specific technological changes made in response to the phaseout of ozone depleting
chemicals); Reynaldo Forte & Robert Livernash, Chilling Out, in OZONE PROTECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 97, 98 (Elizabeth Cook ed., 1996)
(same); Suzi Kerr & Richard Newell, Policy-Induced Technology Adoption: Evidence
from the U.S. Lead Phasedown, 51 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 317, 322-23 (2003)
(describing the technological responses to the ultimate ban of lead in gasoline).
148
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DILs stimulated fundamental changes in the early stages of the program,
before the regulators required full phase-outs.151 Even mild DILs tend to
stimulate innovation, since they demand some basic change. Stringent
DILs demand even more use of innovative technologies, often
innovations that involve fundamental changes in inputs.
This raises the question of whether fundamental change is
superior to incremental change. Incremental change often proves more
cost effective than fundamental change in the short run. It allows for the
continued use of existing capital stock, already developed human capital
(e.g. expertise in the mechanics of internal combustion engines), and
experience with an existing technology’s properties. In the long-run,
however, fundamental change can prove better. Fundamental change
can produce economic growth by stimulating new industries. It can also
improve the quality of life over time and may be essential to addressing
extremely difficult environmental challenges. Finally, a DIL’s capacity
to solve multiple environmental problems at once through pollution
prevention is at its highest when that DIL stimulates fundamental
technological change.
Innovation, whether fundamental or not, can lower the costs of
producing goods and services over time. Innovation can also improve
the quality of goods and services.
Innovations, however, often prove
costly in the short run even if they either reduce costs in the long run or
produce quality improvements justifying their cost. While much of the
instrumental choice literature tends to associate relentless pursuit of cost
effectiveness with innovation,152 one of us has argued elsewhere that

151

See, e.g.,EPA, ACHIEVEMENTS IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE
PROTECTION: PROGRESS REPORT 15 (2007) (describing DuPont as leading the chemical
manufacturing industry search for alternative by abandoning CFCs before the Montreal
Protocol was signed in 1987); PARSON, supra note 92, at 40, 183-191 (describing
various innovations and dating them prior to the ozone phase-out); René Kemp,
Technology and Environmental Policy: Innovation Effects of Past Policies and
Suggestions for Improvement, in OECD, INNOVATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 35, 35
(2000) (stating generally that firms searched for CFC alternatives 10 years before the
ban); Reynaldo Forte & Robert Livernash, Chilling Out, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 97, 98 (Elizabeth Cook ed., 1996) (explaining
the York, a major manufacturer of commercial air conditioning systems, introduced a
“chiller” using an alternative HCFC as early as 1988). Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using
Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 436
(1985) (reporting three innovative responses to the lead phasedown in the late 1970s).
152
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 171, 183 (1988); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading:
Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234-35 (1988);
Hahn & Stavins, supra note 35, at 13; Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Global
Climate Change: How Can Governments Address a Global Environmental Problem,
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 302-03.
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innovation and short term cost effectiveness often conflict.153 For
example, we have relatively cheap personal computers (PCs) because of
decisions to build very expensive supercomputers, which produced the
experience that ultimately made PCs viable.154 PCs are still more
expensive than typewriters, but they make revisions of documents much
easier. Hence, the PC example illustrates the tendency of initially
expensive innovation to lead to both cost reductions over time and
enhanced quality. The same pattern prevails with respect to innovation
addressing environmental problems. Renewable energy, for example,
offers an example of initially expensive innovation delivering high
environmental quality, insofar as it provides energy while reducing
emissions for a variety of pollutants to zero. While it has proven initially
expensive, its costs have fallen over time.155 Hence, innovation has
value that may justify choosing it over more conventional approaches,
even when the conventional approaches are cheaper in the short term.
This value may justify DILs or other measures that may be needed to
overcome inertia produced by the short term cost effectiveness of
sticking with conventional approaches.
B. Disadvantages
1. Disruption.
While fundamental changes can dramatically improve
environmentally quality and reduce costs over time, they tend to disrupt
existing processes. Indeed, the material above defines fundamental
change as that which changes the nature of multiple processes all in one
blow.156 And DILs tend to spur more fundamental change than outputbased regulation.
Indeed, Congress has recognized that DILs have this potential for
disruption and has limited their use because of it. When Congress
constructed a system to address the treatment and disposal of solid waste
153

See Driesen, supra note 148; Driesen, supra note 100.
See LINDA NULL & JULIA LOBUR, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMPUTER
ORGANIZATION AND ARCHITECTURE 19-25 (2d ed. 2006) (the first supercomputer built
with transistors cost $10 million, but integrated circuits and then microprocessors to
minituarize transistors dropped the price and made personal computers possible); see
generally Sabine Messner, Endogenized Technological Learning in an Energy Systems
Model, 7 J. Evolutionary Econ. 291, 293 (1997) (describing “learning by doing” as
“among the best empirically corroborated phenomena characterizing technological
change in industry.”).
155
See, e.g., Sunlit Uplands: Wind and Solar Power Are Flourishing,
Thanks to Subsidies, THE ECONOMIST 16 (June 2, 2007) (wind power costs have fallen
from $2 per kilowatt hour (kwh) in the 1970s to 5-8 cents per kwh; solar power costs
have dropped from $20 per watt of production capacity in the 1970s to $2.70 in 2004).
156
See supra notes 146 to 147 and accompanying text.
154
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in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act157, it recognized that
pollution prevention (conservation, in the words of the statute’s title)
could help us avoid expensive and incomplete treatment of solid waste
altogether.158 Yet, Congress generally declined to give EPA the
authority to promulgate DILs to realize these benefits. Instead, it
required generators of hazardous waste (an important subset of solid
waste) to reduce use of the inputs that led to hazardous waste only to the
extent the generator deems practicable.159 In other words, it left the
decision about whether and how much to reduce inputs to industry,
rather than to EPA.160
Congress understood that industry would only carry out input
reduction under such a mandate when doing so would save the industry
money.161 This means that even when more input reduction would be
optimal for society because it would produce additional benefits along
the production stream, industry would not limit dirty inputs.
The legislative history shows that concerns about disruption of
industry processes drove Congress to forego environmentally and
economically desirable DILs in this context.162 The selection of inputs
into production processes requires expertise and judgment about how to
make a safe and effective product.163 The Congressional rejection of
mandatory input reduction reflects concern that EPA, if given authority
to require input reduction, might unwittingly make decisions that unduly
interfered with sound production decisions. Of course, Congress has
authorized interference with production decisions in order to realize
environmental benefits when it views an environmental problem as
sufficiently serious (as in the lead and ozone cases).164 Yet, the
157

(2000).

158

Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k

See 42 U.S.C. 6902(b) (2000) (establishing a national policy favoring
pollution pollution prevention over disposal); S. Rep. 98-284, at 65 (1983) (describing
treatment as something only necessary for "wastes that are generated"); see also EPA,
Guidance to Hazardous Waste Generators on the Elements of a Waste Minimization
Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 31114, 31115 (May 18, 1993) (explaining that minimizing waste
generation reduces waste management costs).
159
42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (2000).
160
See S. Rep. 98-284, at 66 (1983) (describing the provisions as
encouraging “generators to voluntarily” reduce toxic waste).
161
See id. (stating that the decision about what is “economically
practicable” will be made by the generator of hazardous waste and “is not subject to
subsequent re-evaluation.”)
162
See id. (this provision does not authorize EPA to “interfere with or
intrude into” individual generators’ “production process or production decisions”)
163
See 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66730.
164
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 11 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (when EPA
acts under the Clean Air Act provision authorizing it to impose DILs on fuel additives,
“it is essentially telling manufacturers how to make their fuels, a task Congress felt the
Agency should enter upon only with trepidation”).
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possibility of unwise intrusion is present with a DIL to a greater extent
than it would be with output regulation,165 This possibility often leads
regulators to rely on voluntary approaches to realize input reduction
goals.
Even voluntary input reduction, however, carries with it more
risk of disruption than an end-of-the-pipe approach. Voluntary input
reduction avoids disruption of the volunteer’s manufacturing process,
because manufacturers will only choose pollution prevention moves that
they can manage effectively. But input reductions, even voluntary ones,
can produce disruptions, including unemployment in other industries.
Input reduction can cause a manufacturer to stop purchasing a particular
supply.166 If the input it chooses to reduce or eliminate turns out to be
the sole product or the major product of a supplier, voluntary input
reduction can cause the supplier to layoff labor or even shut down.167
While the pollution prevention literature pays little attention to
this problem, Congress has paid attention to it on occasion. For years, it
insisted on regulating sulfur dioxide from power plants using an end-ofthe-pipe approach, because of concerns that a more flexible performance
standard might lead electric utilities to stop using high sulfur coal, which
could reduce mining jobs in regions producing it. When Congress
finally authorized emissions trading to address acid rain, it recognized
that this approach might encourage wider use of low sulfur coal, thereby
threatening miners’ jobs. It therefore provided economic aid for miners
impacted by these voluntary input reduction choices under emissions
trading.168 Any input reduction approach, whether voluntary or not, can
disrupt labor markets.
While this problem may justify coupling especially disruptive
DILs with some kind of transition aid, this labor disruption problem
should not count as a substantial reason to refrain from using DILs.
DILs may lead not only to job losses, but to offsetting job increases as
well. DILs stimulate demand for substitutes for the restricted input,
which may generate employment in the industries supplying the
alternative input.169 Indeed, some amount of disruption is inevitable in
165

See, e.g., Fully Halogenated Chlorofluroalkanes:
Temporary
Exemption for Automatic Timed-Release Isecticide Dispensing System Used in Longterm Storage of Tobacco, 46 Fed. Reg. 27120, 27121 (1981).
166
See, e.g., Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at
11311.
167
See id. .
168
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 552 (4th ed. 2003).
169
See,.e.g., Mikael Roman, What Order in Progress? Brazilian Energy
Policies and Climate Change in the Beginning of the 21st Century, Centre for Climate
Science and Policy Research, Report No. 07:02
(2007), available at
www.scpr.se/publications (Brazilian support for ethanol as an alternative to gasoline
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competitive markets. Desirable economic changes disrupt labor markets
all the time. No one would ever suggest that we should have avoided the
development of personal computers, because it hurt the business of
typewriter manufacturers. It may be that we should make better
transitional arrangements for workers regardless of the cause of
disruption. Or perhaps we shouldn’t provide such assistance in the
interest of having flexible labor markets. But it makes no sense to
eschew disruption of labor markets for the sake of environmental
benefits, while allowing disruption of labor markets in pursuit of all
kinds of other benefits.
The disruption DILs may cause is generally greatest when they
demand fundamental change. But this is not always true. In the case of
ozone depleting chemicals, many of the firms manufacturing ozone
depleters also made substitutes.170 As a result, phase-outs of ozone
depleting chemicals caused little disruption of labor markets. While they
did disrupt manufacturing processes, they did so quite productively. By
contrast, the phaseout of lead involved less fundamental change, but may
have put some firms out of business. The degree of disruption depends
partly upon the nature of changes demand and partly upon market
structure and technological factors.171
In sum, DILs’ disruptive capacity may constitute a disadvantage.
But DILs’ history suggests that the positive benefits, environmental and
economic, may sometimes justify the disruption.
2. Risk/Risk Problems
While the reduction or elimination of dirty inputs can provide
multiple benefits, it can also create new risks.172 Generally, firms choose
inputs to perform some function.173 If they must eliminate or reduce an
input, they will usually introduce some substitute input to perform a
similar function.174 That substitute can carry risks of its own.175 The use

produced some 720,000 jobs directly and some 200,000 indirectly between 1978 and
1990).
170
See Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at
11311.
171
See id.; Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Adjusting Allowances for
Class I Substances for Export to Article 5 Countries, 71 Fed. Reg. 49395 (2006).
172
See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 407 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1533. 1541-42 (1996) (regulatory bans can lead to introduction of risky substitutes).
See, e.g., 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66730.
173
See, e.g., Protection of Statospheric Ozone: Listing of Substitutes in
the Foam Sector, 67 Fed. Reg. 447703, 47709 (2002).
174
See Helfland, supra note 42, at 15. See, e.g., Protection of
Stratospheric Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 27874 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 SNAP Rule].
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of toxic substitutes for ozone depleters and for lead in gasoline provides
an example of this problem.176
The oft repeated claim that risk/risk problems pervade
environmental law177 suggests that DILs do not differ in this respect
from other regulatory instruments. Risk/risk problems, however, do not
pervade all environmental law equally. While all environmental
instruments can create ancillary risks, DILs have special problems in this
regard that merit consideration.178
Because DILs demand a change in inputs, they can provide
unusually great opportunities to avoid risks associated with current
technologies. But this demand for change also suggests a capacity to
create fundamental new problems.179 Input change may produce either
net environmental gains or serious ancillary risks.180 Still, experience
suggests that targeting serious risks through DILs has often worked well
from a risk/risk perspective. The lead and ozone DILs both produced
risk/risk tradeoffs that ultimately proved beneficial. In both instances, by
targeting very serious risks, we made enormous progress in protecting
public health and the environment, even though producers created some
arguably less severe ancillary risks in the process.181
Like any regulation that provides firms with freedom to make
technological choices, DILs have significant potential to stimulate
introduction of ancillary risks without public evaluation. When
government imposes a work practice standard, it makes the choice about
what new technology will be employed, and its general responsibility to
avoid arbitrary decisions combined with specific statutory language
175

See Helfland, supra note 42, at 15 (substitution of inputs can increase
“damages.”). See, e.g.,1997 SNAP Rule, supra note 174. Professor Helfland also
discusses the possibility that a restricted input might contribute to pollution in some
uses, but not in others, using water as an example. Helfland, supra note 42, at 15. This
problem probably would not arise frequently if one regulates dirty inputs, substance
with a clear association with pollutants of concern, rather than innocuous substances
like water. Similarly her concern that eliminating polluting inputs that complement
abating inputs could have perverse results, see id., should not arise often if regulated
inputs are carefully chosen, see id. at 16 (perverse results are not likely in some
contexts).
176
See supra notes 99 and 115 and accompanying text.
177
AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990); Sunstein,
supra note 172; RISK VERSUS RISK: TRDEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds. 1995). Cf. ALBERT O.
HISRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION (1991).
178
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 32 n. 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Congress specifically required EPA to evaluate substitutes in writing fuel DILs to
avoid “counterproductive results”).
179
See, e.g., 1997 Snap Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 27876-87, 27880-81.
180
See, e.g. Halon Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 11089.
181
See supra notes 77 to 116 and accompanying text.
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directed at risk/risk tradeoffs will usually require it to consider ancillary
risks.182 But when government imposes a DIL requiring a phase-out of a
particular substance, producers are free to introduce any substitute they
choose to replace it, unless some other regulation restrains them.183 This
choice of substitutes can occur largely without public oversight. While
DILs share this defect with most output-based regulation, including
emissions trading, pollution taxes, and performance standards,184 the
problem may be worse in the context of DILs since they are more likely
to spur fundamental technological change.
Nonetheless, one should not leap to the conclusion that we should
eliminate private technological choices by eliminating DILs to assure
public evaluation of important ancillary risks. First, private actors have
some incentives to consider the risks of substitute inputs, because of
fears of liability or future regulation. Private creativity may itself
contribute to risk avoidance. Furthermore, while risk/risk tradeoffs exist,
it does not follow that the new risks will be worse than the old ones, as
the lead and ozone examples demonstrate. Finally, regulators can
prevent DIL-related ancillary risks by prohibiting certain substitutes or
through subsequent regulation.185
We may need some reforms to avoid serious new risks, such as
improvement in the generation of information about new toxic
substances, or a requirement for some government evaluation of
alternative new technologies before DILs are imposed.186 There is a
tension, however, between the desire to evaluate all risks of substitutes
thoroughly in advance and the desire to use private initiative to promptly
reduce known serious risks.187
182

See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), 7412(d)(2) (2000).
183
Cf. 1997 Snap Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 27874.
184
See Daniel J. Dudek, Richard B. Stewart, & Jonathan B. Wiener,
Environmental Policy for Eastern Europe: Technology-Based versus Market-Based
Approaches, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1992) (describing "market-based
approaches" as those that leave "the choice of . . . specific technologies . . .to private
actors")
185
See, e.g. Snap Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 27876-87, 27880-81; Protection
of Stratospheric Ozone: Listing of Substitutes for Ozone Depleting Chemicals, 63 Fed.
Reg. 5491, 5493 (1998).
186
Congress imposed just such a requirement in the context of the lead
DIL, requiring EPA, before prohibiting a fuel additive, to make a finding that “any fuel
or fuel additive likely to replace the prohibited one will ‘not endanger the public health
or welfare to the same or greater degree.’” Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F. 2d 1, 11
(D.C.Cir. 1976). In response to a DIL phasing out asbestos, the United States Court of
Appeals demanded that EPA evaluate available information about substitute products’
risks. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1991).
See also Snap Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 27874.
187
See Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at
11309.
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3. Political Feasibility
DILs, can pose formidable political challenges, because they can
significantly disrupt prevailing practices. This suggests that policymakers might best employ DILs when society needs disruption to solve
serious long-term environmental problems and not when less disruptive
mechanisms appear adequate.
Opponents may wish to paint DILs as akin to Soviet-style
economic planning. Policy-makers should recognize that such charges
are ill-founded. Under a regime of central economic planning, the
government chooses targets for the production of desirable outputs and
dictates the inputs to be used for these purposes. DILs, in contrast, do
not involve production targets or government selection of inputs.
Instead, under a DIL, government simply limits the use of a particular
input, leaving private parties free to choose any economically and
environmentally desirable substitute. And tradable DILs use a marketmechanism to further enhance private sector flexibility. Still, unfounded
charges have considerable potential to create political obstacles.
Any judgment about political practicality, however, must remain
contingent upon the particular time and place. Even if DILs do not pass
a political feasibility test in Washington, D.C. circa 2008, they may pass
such a test in California, in Sweden, or perhaps in Washington, D.C.
after a new election or another decade of climate-related disasters. It is
not too soon to start a debate about them among academics and
policymakers.
III. DILs’ Promise
Now that we have defined DILs, examined some historical
examples of their use, and outlined some of their advantages and
disadvantages, we outline some thinking about the nature of DILs’
potential contribution to environmental law’s future. We will first
explore what sorts of problems they might best address. We will then
show how the mechanism can reshape our thinking about environmental
law.
A. When are DILs Appropriate?
We will first discuss a general theory of when DILs may prove
most helpful. We will then offer a tentative proposal for a DIL limiting
oil production and consumption and offer some other ideas for future
DIL-related research. Our proposals remain tentative, because a
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thorough exploration of any one proposal would require an entire article
and conclusions about such a proposal would require a set of normative
assumptions that would themselves require a detailed defense. DILs’
powerful advantages, however, particularly their capacity to
simultaneously solve multiple environmental problems and their history
of having driven beneficial cost-reducing innovations, suggest that
policy-makers should consider them seriously in the types of situations
we describe below.
1. Relevant Factors
The foregoing discussion suggests that a number of factors may
make DILs a desirable option for particular environmental problems.
First, DILs are most promising when actions reducing inputs can cure
substantial inefficiencies or where less environmentally harmful
substitute inputs are available or at least conceivable.188 Moreover, DILs
will prove particularly attractive for addressing environmental problems
that involve a production stream with multiple significant pollution
outputs.
Because DILs provide no incentive for the installation of end-ofthe-pipe technologies, they may be most attractive in situations in which
such technologies are not available. Since they don’t require polluting
emissions to be measured or monitored, DILs are also likely to be
attractive in circumstances where pollution outputs cannot be easily
monitored, as where pollution seeps into the environment from numerous
diffuse locations.
Because DILs tend to promote fundamental
technological innovation with all the potential for economic disruption
that goes along with such change, they may be most appropriate for
environmental problems that warrant such changes in order to address
serious harms, especially those that would be irreversible.
Finally, DILs may be useful when government lacks the
resources to comprehensively regulate all relevant outputs. By and large
the instrument choice debate has focused on the efficient use of private
resources and has paid much less attention to how governments’ limited
regulatory capabilities can best be deployed.
For important
environmental problems of broad scope, efficient use of government
resources can be critical, especially in less developed countries. And
DILs will often use government resources more efficiently than most
competing instruments.
To summarize, where one or more of the following factors is
present, an environmental problem may be one for which DILs present a
desirable alternative:
188

See 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66730. Cf. Propellants in
Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11312-13.
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1) Feasibility: Reductions of inputs are feasible.
2) Multiple Outputs: The production process(es) from which
the environmental problem stems produce(s) multiple
environmentally damaging outputs.
3) End-of-Pipe: End-of-the-pipe technologies are not available.
4) Monitoring:
The polluting outputs cannot be easily
measured or monitored.
5) Serious or Irreversible Environmental Harm:
The
problem is serious enough to warrant forcing significant
innovation, even at the cost of some disruption.
6) Government: A relevant government does not have the
resources to adequately address each relevant output and
harm using an output-based approach
All of these factors do not need to be present in order for DILs to
present a good option. Ozone depleting chemicals, for example, did not
involve a long production stream with multiple environmentally
damaging outputs. Nor will DILs necessarily be the best option in all
circumstances in which one or more of these factors are present. If
government can adequately address multiple outputs cheaply through
comprehensive output regulation and the problem does not demand
fundamental innovation, then perhaps an output-based approach may
prove superior.
History suggests that policy-makers tend to consider DILs most
seriously when other approaches simply seem impracticable. But their
powerful advantages suggest that policy-makers should consider them
even when other alternatives are practicable, but the need for innovation
or the lack of governmental capacity for sufficiently comprehensive
output controls justifies them. In any event, the feasibility, multiple
outputs, end-of-pipe, monitoring, innovation, and government factors
provide a good starting point for analyzing the desirability of particular
DILs.
2. Fossil Fuel DILs and Other Possibilities
DILs have the potential to address a number of environmental
problems more effectively than many competing instruments. The
federal government has used them in a limited way to address pesticide
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use, and might productively use them more expansively, perhaps limiting
overall pesticide use rather than just individual chemicals. The entire
area of non-point source pollution, the most serious remaining water
pollution problem in the United States, poses challenges for output-based
regulation and arguably possesses all of the characteristics that invite
serious consideration of DILs.189
While many possibilities exist, we wish to focus here on the use
of DILs to address fossil fuel use. This focus will allow us to make the
entire mechanism more concrete and better explore some of the key
factors we have mentioned. This exploration will also set the stage for
understanding DILs’ broader significance as an aid to reconceptualizing
environmental law. While we focus primarily on a DIL limiting oil use,
most of our observations about this DIL would apply to DILs limiting
other fossil fuels or a DIL limiting the carbon content of fuels generally.
a. Fossil Fuel DILs: Some Options
All of the factors that may justify a DIL are present to some
degree in fossil fuels. We have already shown that they flow through
production streams that generate numerous heavily polluting outputs190
(factor 2) and that end-of-the-pipe controls do not exist for carbon
dioxide emissions from transportation191 (factor 3). Fossil fuels are by
far the most important cause of global warming, accounting for some
80% of the warming potential from all greenhouse gases combined.192
And global warming threatens such severe and irreversible harms that
widespread agreement now exists on the need for substantial innovation
to address it, especially in the energy sector (factor 5).193 Reductions in
fossil fuel inputs are feasible, through both improved energy efficiency
189

See MARK DORFMAN AND NANCY STONER, TESTING THE WATERS: A
GUIDE TO WATER QUALITY AT VACATION BEACHES iv (2007), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/water/oceans/ttw/titinx.asp; MTBE Proposed Ban, 65 Fed. Reg. at
16102.
190
See supra notes 21 to 23 and accompanying text.
191
See supra note 61.
192
Nordhaus & Danish, PEW REPORT, supra note 51, at 2.
193
See, e.g., Interview with Lewis Milford, Clean Air Group, Clean
Energy Group (July 5, 2006) (experts agree that the world needs significant innovation
in how energy is produced to adequately address climate change); ANDREW E. DESSLER
& EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A
GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 102-106 (2006); Kevin A. Baumert, Note, Participation of
Developing Countries in the International Climate Change Regime: Lessons for the
Future, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 365, 388 (2006) (effectively addressing climate
change requires “large-scale technological and behavioral changes”). Cf. S. Pacala &
R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next Fifty
Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 (2004) (arguing that existing
technologies can stabilize climate over the next fifty years, but not making this claim
with respect to the cuts needed after that time).
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and deployment of alternative energy sources (factor 1). While some of
fossil fuels’ pollution outputs can be reliably and inexpensively
monitored (emissions from large industrial sources), others like motor
vehicle emissions, are too numerous and disparate for effective
monitoring to be practicable (factor 4). This, in turn, raises concerns
about whether governments have the necessary resources to adequately
regulate each of the many pollution outputs along each fossil fuel’s
production stream. These concerns are even more acute when it comes
to the over-extended and under-resourced governments of many
developing nations. Indeed a number of scholars have already raised
doubts about the ability of developing country governments to properly
implement the output-based trading mechanisms called for by the Kyoto
Protocol.194 Thus, fossil fuel DILs merit serious consideration.
For convenience, we focus on the possibility of a DIL limiting
the production and use of oil. We could have chosen coal. One could
choose to use DILs to limit some fossil fuels and not others. One could
also use a suite of DILs to address all fossil fuels. Alternatively, one
might focus on carbon as an input.195 Since coal, oil, and gas consist
mostly of carbon, a limit on carbon would function as a limit on
gasoline, coal, and oil.196 Designing a DIL that way would add
flexibility and might merit policy-makers’ consideration. We focus on
an oil DIL here in part because this single substance DIL provides a
simpler illustration of the concept than a very broad DIL. Moreover, a
carbon DIL suggests a focus on global warming (even though in practice
it would provide many non-carbon environmental benefits). While that
is certainly an important problem, one of the prime values of a DIL is its
capacity to spur a broader framing of environmental issues. Focusing on
the many adverse environmental effects of a substance like oil provides a
nice illustration of that potential.
Policy-makers designing a DIL for oil would first have to
confront the question of how stringent the limit on inputs should be. One
approach would be to simply limit the projected increase in oil
consumption. For example, a government could decide that oil
consumption would only increase by 1% a year. If the economy would
otherwise increase oil consumption by 10% a year, this would spur some
fundamental technological change and avoid future environmental
damage, but to a limited extent. Alternatively, a government could set a
194

See, e.g., Ruth Greenspan Bell, Choosing Environmental Policy
Instruments in the Real World, in OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: EMISSIONS TRADING 10 (2003).
195
See, e.g., Nordhaus & Danish, Pew Report, supra note 51; CBO
Report, supra note 51; Hargrave, supra note 66.
196
See FARRELL, supra note 75, at 9 (compliance with California’s
carbon intensity target for transportation fuels will require movement to new fuels “that
do not require petroleum.”).
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DIL preventing any rise in oil consumption above current levels.197 Or it
could limit future oil consumption to some fraction of existing
consumption.198 This last approach would demand real cuts, produce
substantial environmental improvements, change technologies in a
profound way, and might seriously disrupt existing industry in favor of
new industries with competing technologies. Finally, government could
phase out oil altogether.199 This approach would probably require a long
implementation period to manage and ameliorate disruption.200 But it
would maximize both environmental benefits and disruptions of the oil
industry.
Let’s assume a government decided to implement a 20 percent
reduction in oil consumption. It would next have to decide where along
the production stream to impose the DIL. One alternative would be to
impose the DIL downstream, on the gasoline and other oil products
purchased by consumers. A gas rationing scheme of this sort, however,
would pose substantial administrative difficulties. While we did ration
gas as part of the effort to win the Second World War, it is not clear that
environmentally motivated gas rationing could induce the degree of
citizen cooperation that the war effort produced.201 It does not seem
practicable to enforce gas rationing without such cooperation. Even if
such cooperation were a realistic possibility, such a scheme would
require an enormous administrative apparatus.202
A better model would take an approach more like the Montreal
Protocol and impose the DIL further upstream. The government could
limit the production and importing of oil by auctioning off allowances
equal to 80 percent of the oil consumption in a given year.203 It would
then require producers to hold allowances for every barrel of oil
produced and importers to hold allowances for every barrel imported.
To soften the transition, the government might choose to follow the
practice of other trading programs and allocate more allowances in the

197

Cf. 1980 CFC Proposal, supra note 23, at 66729.
Cf. id..
199
Cf. 1993 Phaseout, supra note 88.
200
Cf. id. at 65024.
201
Cf. Chester Bowles, OPA Volunteers: Big Democracy in Action, 5
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 350, 350-59 (Autumn 1945).
202
See George H. Watson, State Participation in Gasoline Rationing, 3
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 213, 213-22 (Summer 1943).
203
Cf. CBO Report, supra note 51, at ix. We have provided a simplified
model that would work adequately in a country that consumed all of the oil it produced.
If the country, however, exported oil, this model would produce more than a 20%
reduction of domestic consumption. If policy makers wanted to only limit domestic
consumption and not the domestic economies impact on oil use worldwide, it could
give extra allowances to producers who ship oil overseas to cover the exports. This
highlights a problem of leakage, which is not unique to DILs.
198
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early years of a program with the number of allowances declining to 80
percent over time.
If the DILs were going to be tradable, the government would
simply add a rule stating that anybody producing or importing less than
their DIL, could sell surplus allowances to anybody wishing to exceed
their DIL. These allowances could be expressed in terms of barrel of oil.
Notice that tracking barrels of oil should be much simpler than tracking
emissions, as we do in emissions trading.
This is not a complete description of how the mechanism would
work, nor is necessarily the best way to design it. But it suffices to make
the idea of a DIL concrete in this context.
b. An Oil DIL as Climate Change Policy.
Most scientific descriptions of how society might ameliorate
global warming recognize the need to abandon fossil fuels over time and
therefore focus on the variety of technological substitutes available for
fossil fuels. Yet, the vast literature on potential legal responses to
climate change does not generally investigate how governments might
craft regulation to spur a substitution of new technologies for fossil fuels
directly. Rather, it engages in a rather abstract debate about mechanisms
that would generally encourage carbon “abatement.”204
The Kyoto Protocol contains no less than three different types of
emissions trading programs, all conceived as opportunities for countries
with expensive abatement options to purchase cheaper reductions
abroad.205 While scholars have predicted that trading under the Kyoto
Protocol would encourage innovation, it has in practice, encouraged
mostly end-of-the-pipe compliance options, such as the application of
thermal oxiders to control HFC 23, a potent greenhouse gas.206 The

204

See generally BRIAN P. FLANNERY AND CHARLOTTE A.B. GREZO,
EDS., IPIECA SYMPOSIUM ON CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE (1997); DARWIN C. HALL AND RICHARD B. HOWARTH, EDS., THE LONG-TERM
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: BEYOND A DOUBLING OF GREENHOUSE GAS
CONCENTRATIONS, VOL. 3 OF ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RESOURCES (2001); MICHAEL A. TOMAN, ED., CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND
POLICY: AN RFF ANTHOLOGY (2001); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES
(1991); RUDIGER DORNBUSCH AND JAMES M. POTERBA, EDS., GLOBAL WARMING:
ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES (1991).
205

See Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall,
Designing an International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, 15 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 160 (2001).
206
See Driesen, supra note 143, at ___. Output-based trading sometimes
produces innovation and may produce some under the Kyoto Protocol in time. One of
us has elsewhere questioned the idea that emissions trading better stimulates innovation

March 4, 2008 Draft

THE MISSING INSTRUMENT

48

reason for this is that end-of-the-pipe controls are less expensive than the
fundamental technological changes that would prevent most of the
pollution causing global warming. The Kyoto Protocol encourages the
most cost effective options in the short term, taking existing
technological choices as a given. It tends, therefore, to disfavor
expensive investments that would fundamentally change technologies
over time.
Furthermore, the end-of-the-pipe focus has provided no means
for getting a handle on stopping the fundamental drivers of climate
change, the proliferation of dirty vehicles and coal-fired power plants
around the world. The output focus of Kyoto’s mechanisms is certainly
not the major culprit in this failure. The failure to agree on sufficiently
ambitious and comprehensive emission caps is much more important.
But this failure has meant that the world has felt free to build new coalfired power installations that condemn us to more rapid climate change
in the future with Kyoto’s emissions trading mechanisms functioning as
a minor band-aid, an amelioration of very bad fundamental technological
choices that remain largely unconstrained in most countries.
Considering DILs forces a confrontation with the need to change these
choices.
In addition, Kyoto’s focus on outputs by necessity leaves out a
significant percentage of greenhouse gas emissions driving climate
change, since emissions trading covering the transportation sector is
infeasible.207 DILs provide a relatively simple and elegant mechanism
for regulating climate change on an economy-wide basis.
DILs may also offer some advantages over the more viable nontrading methods that have been used to address transport emissions.
Insofar as countries address vehicle emissions at all under Kyoto, they
tend toward fragmentary responses. The most common measures used in
this sector involve fuel efficiency standards.208 But if people drive more
as fuel efficiency improves, these changes may not provide absolute

than performance standards of identical scope and stringency. See, e.g., Driesen, supra
note 148; Driesen, supra note 100.
207
See supra notes 56 to 60 and accompanying text.
208
The latest set of Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFÉ)
standards issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in
2006, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006), took what many viewed as far too modest
steps to tighten fuel efficiency standards for SUVs, mini-vans and pick-up trucks. A
lawsuit brought by a coalition of states and environmental groups challenging the rule
recently resulted in a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals striking it down.
See Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
No. 06-71891 (9th Cir. 2007). The new energy bill passed in late 2007 will raise CAFÉ
standards for cars to 35 miles per gallon by 2020. See Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007, P.L. 110-140, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
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reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. So, this response is attractively
cheap, but unreliable (unless accompanied by DILs).
Subsidies can also help encourage movement away from fossil
fuels.209 Brazil, which may have made more progress than any other
country in reducing dependence on gasoline, has employed a
combination of subsidies and regulation of fuel content.210 Where
governments are sufficiently honest and effective to choose targets for
subsidies wisely, subsidizing alternatives to fossil fuels can be an
effective approach. In other cases, DILs offer the advantage of relying
on private sector selection of substitutes, when government corruption
might otherwise lead to poor environmental choices.
Subsidies
combined with DILs will provide a powerful impetus for change, both
raising the price of gasoline and lowering the price of the subsidized
substitutes.
A DIL reducing oil consumption by 20 percent would impose a
fundamental constraint that would force fuel producers, car
manufacturers, and consumers to innovate to stay within the constraint.
As such, it has much greater potential to stimulate the sort of innovation
needed to address climate change in the long-term than the piecemeal
approach currently employed to address transport.211
Moreover, an oil DIL addresses the full array of oil related
pollution, not only carbon dioxide. An oil DIL offers a simpler more
comprehensive approach to this vast array of problems than the
piecemeal approach we now use. DILs merit serious consideration by
policy-makers, both for fossil fuels and for other problems that strain the
output-based regulatory system.
B. Changing Our Thinking
DILs have value beyond their potential utility as an instrument in
our arsenal of environmental tools. Serious thought about DILs can help
us productively rethink environmental law. Below we explore how DILs
add to our understanding of instrument choice, raise important questions
about cost-benefit analysis, and finally challenge the way we define
environmental problems in the first place.
DILs help broaden our thinking about instrument choice, as we
suggested at the outset. They help us move beyond the sterile debate
209

See, e.g., Governor Signs Bills on Tax Credits, Greenhouse Gas
Emission Reduction Goals, 38 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 1744 (August 10, 2007); House
Passes Bill With Tax Incentives to Promote Renewable Energy, 38 ENVT. REP. (BNA)
1730 (August 10, 2007).
210
See MIKAEL ROMAN, WHAT ORDER IN PROGRESS? BRAZILIAN
ENERGY POLICIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY
(Center for Climate Science and Policy Research Report No. 07:02) 49 (2007) .
211
Cf., Roman, supra note 169, at 72.
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about choices between vaguely defined command-and-control regulation
and equally vaguely defined market-based instruments. They show that
choices about whether to regulate inputs or outputs may matter as much
or more than choices among conventional output-based instruments.
1. Instrument Choice: DILs and Pollution Taxes
DILs also can help improve our thinking about environmental
taxes, which in some polities may compete with DILs for policy-makers’
allegiance.212 We have seen that economists implicitly distinguish
between upstream and downstream taxes and recognize the
administrative cost savings often available from choosing upstream
taxes.213 Our analysis highlights a feature of many upstream taxes that
economists have rarely grappled with explicitly, that upstream taxes
often, although not always, will tax inputs rather than outputs.214 When
they tax inputs, they will have many of DILs’ advantages and
disadvantages.
To see this, imagine a tax on coal. Electric utilities could only
escape this tax by reducing coal usage. Carbon sequestration would not
reduce the amount of coal used and therefore would not reduce the tax.
Like a DIL, then, an input tax will tend to produce more fundamental
innovation (e.g. switching from coal to other fuels) than will an ouput
tax, though it will prove less cost effective in meeting a narrowly defined
objective that might be achieved with a cheaper end-of-the-pipe
control.215 Also like a DIL a properly designed input tax on coal may
prove superior in addressing the multiple effects of coal-mining than an
output tax on power plant CO2 emissions. Thus, one can expect a tax on
inputs to offer advantages over output-based taxes similar to those that
DILs offer over output-based emissions trading.
The DIL analysis can inform the design of pollution taxes.
Economists have dominated this discussion, so that it focuses
predominantly on static economic efficiency. For problems sufficiently
serious to justify major innovation, however, questions of efficacy and
dynamic efficiency may prove more important.216 To design a tax
encouraging substitution of cleaner inputs, the main objective of a DIL,
212

Cf.
Catherine Boemare & Philippe Quiron, Implementing
Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe: Lessons from Economic Literature and
International Experiences, 43 Ecological Econ. 213, 219 (2002).
213
See Baranzini, supra note 45, at 406; Muller & Hoerner, supra note
45, at 42.
214
Cf. Arild Vatn, Input versus Emission Taxes: Environmental Taxes in
a Mass Balance and Transaction Costs Perspective, 74 LAND ECON. 514 (1998).
215
Cf. Stavins, supra note 51, at 18.
216
See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003).
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one would need impose a tax high enough to make substitutes cost less
than the dirty input one hopes to reduce. Even those who prefer making
static efficiency the major goal of environmental regulation may find this
approach attractive.
Frequently, the uncertainties involved in
quantifying the social cost of pollution for purposes of setting optimal
tax rates are so great, that the economists’ call to establish a tax rate
equal to social costs offers no practical policy guidance.217 In such
cases, using an analysis of the relative costs of dirty inputs and clean
substitutes to inform tax design offers a workable alternative.
In the United States, pollution taxes may be politically
infeasible,218 making DILs, even with their political problems, a
potentially attractive option. In other polities, however, the conventional
literature on choosing between taxes and tradable permits can inform this
choice.219 This literature suggests that in some circumstances DILs will
prove more efficient than input taxes, while in other circumstances the
converse will be true.220 It suggests that allowing the public to directly
control the amount of reductions made, as in a DIL, is more democratic
than making the amount of reductions depend on private actors’
decisions about how to respond to price increases.221 One might also
claim that DILs provide greater certainty about how much pollution
reduction is to be achieved, while taxes on inputs provide less, thus
suggesting that DILs may prove superior when certainty about the
environmental results is of paramount interest.222 And conversely, one
may assert that taxes provide greater certainty about costs, suggesting
that taxes may prove better if a cost constraint is of paramount
importance.223 We do not claim that DILs always are better than input
217

See Stewart, supra note 125, at 154 Sinden, supra note 44, at 555;
David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 594-600 (1997) .
218
See Bohm & Russell, supra note 1, at 404-05.
219
See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 58-70 (2nd ed. 1988); William Pizer, Prices vs. Quantities
Revisited: The Case of Climate Change (RFF, Discussion Paper 98-02, Oct. 1997);
Robert N. Stavins, Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice, 30 J. Envtl.
Econ. & Management 218 (1996); M. L.Weitzman, Prices Versus Quantities, 41 REV.
ECON. STUDIES 477 (1974).
220
According to this literature, when there is uncertainty about the costs
of control, then which instrument produces the more efficient result will depend on the
relative slopes of the marginal benefits curve and the marginal cost curve. When the
benefits curve is relatively flat and the costs curve is relatively steep, then taxes will be
more efficient. When the converse is true, trading will be more efficient. See BAUMOL
& OATES, supra note 219, at 58-70; Weitzman, supra note 219.
221
Cf. Propellants in Self-Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11311.
222
See 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, 53 Fed. Reg. at 30567. See also
id. at 30579.
223
A critique of these conventional arguments lies beyond the scope of
the article.
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taxes, but we do claim that DILs improve our thinking about
environmental taxation.
2. Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis
To the extent that governments employ cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) to evaluate DILs, they require a different approach than we
have used hitherto. CBA of climate change implicitly evaluates a DIL,
because economists usually evaluate the costs of climate change
abatement by estimating, in various ways, the cost of reducing fossil fuel
use.225 The above analysis, however, suggests that the benefits of a DIL
addressing fossil fuels will go beyond climate change benefits. Thus, a
proper analysis of an oil DIL’s benefits would include consideration of
the full array of environmental harms associated with oil use, many of
which we have previously discussed.226
Yet, CBA has proven controversial, in part, because we cannot
quantify and monetize many of the environmental impacts that matter the
most.227 Demanding that government officials evaluate a DIL’s
desirability through CBA may prove crippling, even if it should pass the
test by a wide margin. CBA of an oil DIL will prove especially difficult
because of the large variety of environmental benefits associated with
this DIL. CBA may inadvertently discourage governments from
adopting the most valuable DILs, because a large array of benefits makes
it hard to conduct comprehensive quantitative analysis.
DILs also pose challenges on the cost side of the equation.
Economists usually evaluate costs by reference to the current market
price of abatement measures. Because of this, they have a poor record at
predicting the costs of regulation, because regulation often changes
markets. They usually predict higher costs than regulations actually
224

224

See Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of
Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1413–23 (2005).
225
See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE STERN REVIEW 258-262 (2006); Terry Barker et al., Avoiding Dangerous Climate
Change by Inducing Technological Progress; Scenarios Using a Large-Scale
Econometric Model, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 339 (Hans Joachim
Schellnhuber et al. eds. 2006).
226
Accord FARRELL ET AL., supra note 75, at 77.
227
See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77
COLO. L. REV. 335, 339-41 (2006); Sinden, supra note 224, 1423-30; Amy Sinden, The
Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of
Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 202-207 (2004)
(discussing nonquantifiability of many benefits associated with critical habitat
designations to protect endangered species); 1989 Reduction, supra note 88, at 30593,
30595.
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produce.228 DILs tend to encourage innovation. Predicting the
magnitude of cost savings from innovation is probably impossible, which
may encourage policy-makers and economists looking for easily
defensible methodology to fail to take innovation into account. Failing
to take innovation into account will lead to exaggerated estimates of a
DIL’s costs. This is precisely what has happened with early climate
change cost-benefit analysis, which produced very high cost estimates by
assuming that no innovation would occur.229
A change in thinking about environmental policy might be
necessary to properly evaluate DILs. We doubt that an extremely
incomplete effort to quantify the dollar value of environmental and
health benefits coupled with a terribly unreliable estimate of the cost of a
DIL will provide useful guidance to policy makers.230 Instead, it might
make sense to address the primary concerns that DILs raise, those related
to disruption and risk/risk possibilities directly.
With respect to disruption, this would include some evaluation of
who might profit from DILs and who might lose out.231 This could
include efforts to convince oil companies to invest in substitutes for
gasoline, something which is beginning to occur, in order to minimize
disruption of their business. It might include transition mechanisms for
workers losing jobs or efforts to support new businesses that might be
needed to make an effective transition. If a gasoline DIL is expected to
raise fuel costs significantly, this may suggest a need to subsidize low
income drivers and/or invest in mass transit.232 We suggest, however,
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See W. Harrington & R.D. Morgenstern, et al., On the Accuracy of
Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. Policy Analysis & Management 297 (2000); H.
Hodges, Falling Prices: Costs of Complying with Environmental Regulations Almost
Always Less Than Advertised, Economic Policy Institute (1997); U.S. Congress, Office
of Technology Assessment, Gauging Control Technology and Regulatory Impacts in
Occupational Safety and Health—An Appraisal of OSHA’s Analytic Approach, U.S.
Government
Printing
Office
OTA-ENV-635,
available
at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2004_cb_final.pdf; Thomas O. McGarity &
Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation,
80 Tex. L. Rev. 1997, 2042-44 (2002) (collecting studies); Ruth Ruttenberg, Not Too
Costly After All: An Examination of the Inflated Cost Estimates of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Protections, (Public Citizen White Paper, Feb. 2004), available at:
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF187.pdf.
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Cf. STERN, supra note 222, at 262.
230
Cf. Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for
Liberals, 29 Columb. J. Envl. L. 191, 201-28 (2004) (arguing that CBA fails to provide
meaningful guidance to policymakers).
231
See Richard D. Morgenstern, Mun Ho, Jhih-Shiyang Shih, & Xuehua
Zhang, The Near Term Impacts of Carbon Mitigation Policies on Manufacturing
Industries (2002).
232
See Nordhaus & Danish, Pew Report, supra note 51, at 15-16
(suggesting targeted tax breaks or lump-sum payments to low income people to
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that any evaluation of costs be expressed as a range of values
incorporating varying assumptions about innovation.233 We should
recognize that a cost number in a policy evaluation is a prediction about
the future, not a fact.234
This approach suggests a normative point that one of us has made
elsewhere. The distribution of costs may be more important than the
total amount.235 Furthermore, it suggests that cost must be treated not as
a fact, but as a factor subject to change in response to human decisions
about investment and policy.
We do not mean to stack the deck in favor of any particular DIL.
If analysis suggested that our oil DIL, for example, would mean that
people can no longer get to their jobs or drop their children off at school,
society would have to decide about whether this price is worth paying in
order to effectively address global warming and oil’s other
environmental impacts. But we do think that disruption of people’s lives
and of their health and environment matter and are worthy of analysis.
Summations of dollar estimates of costs and benefits do not provide the
necessary information.
Furthermore, policy-makers should consider additional
qualitative factors. Oil will run out eventually. Society should think
about whether moving away from it before we commit ourselves to
significantly more global warming has advantages over waiting until we
have used the last drop or it has become so expensive that even the most
expensive substitutes are viable.
In short, a DIL focuses our attention on the question of how to
achieve sustainable development. Sustainable development is usually
defined as an approach that meets the basic needs of current generations
while protecting future generations.236
Advocates of sustainable
development envision an “integrated” approach to decision-making,
where the public participates in choosing a path that harmonizes desire
for economic development with environmental quality.237 The current
focus on pollution outputs basically accepts development paths chosen
compensate for increased energy costs); Morgenstern, Reducing Carbon Emissions,
supra note 62, at 6.
233
See, e.g., STERN, supra note 225, at 239 .
234
See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 75, at 78.
235
See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2004).
236
World Commission on Environment & Development, Our Common
Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment & Development, at 54, U.N.
Doc A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987).
237
See John C. Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development: The
Centrality and Multiple Facets of Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 247, 248, 250 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and
Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2116 (2005) .
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with little or no consideration of environmental problems, and then seeks
to compensate for that path’s negative environmental consequences.
Evaluating a DIL provides a forum for the sort of integrated
consideration of meeting peoples’ needs that sustainable development
envisions.
A DIL also advances sustainable development in the sense
articulated by the economist Herman Daly. He argues that society
should hold steady or reduce inputs of non-renewable natural resources
and outputs of pollution, i.e. throughput.238 He advocates a distinction
between economic development, which envisions innovation in meeting
human needs, and economic growth, which relies upon constant and
ultimately unsustainable increases in throughput.239 A DIL focuses on
throughput reduction, not just output reduction, and therefore provides a
mechanism for achieving sustainable development in Daly’s sense.
3. Redefining Environmental Problems
In considering whether any of the DILs described above would
be desirable, the first question one would ask is whether serious
environmental problems justify them. Just thinking about this question
forces a useful reconceptualization of environmental problems.
We tend to think about environmental problems in a very
fragmentary way. We think about global climate change, urban smog,
oil spills, and hazardous air pollutants, for example, as separate
environmental problems. Many environmental scholars lament the
fragmented nature of environmental law and policy.240 Yet, these
complaints ring hollow, not because they are necessarily wrong, but
because the authors of these laments often have no viable proposal about
how to better integrate our effort. It is not possible to address, or even
think about, all environmental problems at once, so we must fragment
our treatment of environmental threats in some way to begin to analyze
these problems or address them. Thus, an assertion that we need a
“comprehensive approach” to environmental problems and lamentations
about fragmentation do not suffice. We need changes in how we think
about and address environmental problems that are narrow enough to
facilitate meaningful analysis and action, but not so fragmented that we
miss too many important connections or act ineffectually.

238

See HERMAN E. DALY, STEADY-STATE ECONOMICS, 14-50 (1991).
See Herman E. Daly, Sustainable Growth: An Impossibility Theorem,
in VALUING THE EARTH 267-71 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Twonsend, eds. 1992).
240
See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SETTING
PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY (1995).
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Viewing all of the many problems to which fossil fuel contributes
as separate problems leads to a fragmented response to the problems it
creates. For example, we regulate volatile organic compounds from
petroleum refineries, because they contribute to smog.241 We then
regulate most of these same compounds again, because many of them are
also hazardous air pollutants — pollutants associated with cancer and
other extremely serious health effects.242 We then regulate oil spills
separately. And, further downstream, we regulate vehicle emissions
traceable to gasoline under another series of regulations.243
Once we notice how prominent a contributor fossil fuels are to a
vast array of environmental problems, including, most prominently,
global warming, we should ask whether we should consider fossil fuel
use as the problem to solve. This question invites a radical redefinition
of environmental policy. It suggests that we consider the myriad impacts
of fossil fuel use together along with their myriad benefits. Once we do
this, we see instantly that fossil fuel use is absolutely devastating, lying
at the heart of global warming and most other serious environmental
problems. On the other hand, we see that fossil fuel use performs an
important role in powering our economy.
In considering the desirability of a DIL for oil, one would be
concerned about whether a reduction in oil consumption would disrupt
transportation.
This question usefully refocuses debate about
environmental policy. It’s extremely clear that getting reducing gasoline
consumption is environmentally desirable. It’s also clear that gasoline
has no intrinsic worth. Rather, it is a means toward the end of mobility.
The right question to ask is could we have mobility with less oil (or no
oil).244
This question leads to consideration of substitutes for gasoline in
the broader sense we discussed earlier, including the potential for energy
efficiency improvements, alternative fuels, and perhaps even to the
potential role of bicycles and mass transit. In other words it leads to
evaluation of the feasibility of moving away from gasoline toward
cleaner approaches. We think these are difficult questions to answer.
While some information exists about substitutes and their costs, we have
already mentioned that DILs tend to change costs by encouraging cost
241

See Environmental Protection Agency, Revisions to the California
State Implementation Plan, San Joaquin Valley, Unified Air Pollution Control District,
71 Fed. Reg. 14,652 (Mar. 23, 2006) .
242
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000).
243
See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(2000).
244
This is not the only impact that must be considered. Oil has some
non-transportation uses. See Hargrave, supra note 66, at 9 (noting that some of these
uses might have no climate change impacts); Tim Hargrave, Sam Keller, & David
Festa, Accounting for Non-Fuel Uses of Fossil Fuels in an Upstream Carbon Trading
System (1998).
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reducing innovation. Thus, any conversation about substitutes should
include some discussion of the capabilities of private industry to
innovate in response to the DIL and of communities to change modes of
transportation, not just a bureaucrat’s assessment of the current costs and
benefits of the status quo. This focus on feasibility in a broad sense and
the potential for innovation stimulates a useful conversation wholly apart
from the conclusions one might reach. It asks the right questions in light
of what we know about fossil fuel’s environmental effects.
We have deliberately addressed the DIL proposed here in a fairly
general way, focusing on the nature of its potential impacts both on
discourse and on society, rather than purporting to calculate its precise
effects. This general approach means that the lessons we have drawn as
to how DILs productively reshape thinking about environmental law and
stimulate significant environmentally productive innovation apply to
other DILs that address fundamental inputs. DIL’s advantages seem
powerful enough to merit serious consideration even in cases where
output regulation is perfectly feasible.
Conclusion
DILs have a great track record and significant potential to meet
our most pressing environmental challenges. Policy makers should
seriously consider DILs, especially when confronting problems that
demand significant technological changes. Consideration of DILs helps
us to reconceptualize environmental law in a more holistic and dynamic
way.

